On 05 Feb 2014, at 20:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:53:56 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Feb 2014, at 13:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:37:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Numbers can be derived from sensible physics
That is a claim often done, but nobody has ever succeed without
assuming Turing universality (and thus the numbers) in their
description of physics.
Turing universality can just be a property of physics, like density
or mass.
That is close to just nonsense (but I agree that some notorious
physicists are attracted to this, but they don't convince me).
Can you explain why?
Because Turing universality is a mathematical notion.
It has nothing to do with physics. But physics can implement them, and
that notion is not that obvious.
Just as Comp does a brute appropriation of qualia under 1p
uncertainty,
No. That would be a confusion between []p and []p & p (or others).
Only God can do that confusion.
You seem to go back and forth between making qualia something
transcendent and private, to making it somehow inevitable
mathematically.
Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when machine
looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot avoid some
private transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic, with standard
definition for transcendence.
If we ask ourselves, 'Does being a good mathematician require you to
be a good artist or musician?', the answer I think is no.
I am not sure. But "good mathematician" is vague. "Good artist" also.
If we ask 'Does being a good artist or musician require us to be a
good mathematician?' the answer is also no. Why is the relation
between math, physics, and science so obvious,
Such relation are not obvious. That is why we discuss them. Indeed
comp changes them radically.
but the relation between any of those and the arts is not so obvious?
because to add numbers you need few bytes. To pain Mona Lisa, you nee
much more bytes, and richer 1p experiences.
physics can do a brute appropriation of arithmetic under material
topology.
Some material disposition can be shown to be Turing universal. But
this is proved in showing how such system can implement a universal
machine (quantum or not quantum one).
Don't you just have to go to a level of description where the
material appears granular. I don't really get the argument that all
matter is computable but not all computation can be materialized.
Comp implies that matter is not computable. "materialization" is an
emergent phenomenon on coherence conditions on infinite sum of
computations.
It would explain why Turing universality does not apply to gases
It applies to gases. technically no usable, as it is hard to put all
the gaz molecules
Not talking about gas molecules, I'm talking about a volume of ideal
gas.
at the right position at the right time, but in principle, gases, in
some volume, are Turing universal system.
You would need to control that volume with non-gaseous containers
and valves. Gas is still not Turing universal as an uncontained
ideal gas. Computation requires formal, object-like units...because
arithmetic is not really universal, it is only low level.
and empty space.
Hmm... Quantum vacuum is Turing universal. I think.
I'm talking about an ideal vacuum though, not the vacuum that we
imagine is full of particle-waves or probability juice. If I'm right
about the sense primitive, energy exists only within matter, and not
in space.
For classical physics, you need at least three bodies.
Computers require object-like properties to control and measure
digitally.
Yes.
You often say, "we can do that", but this makes sense only if you
do it actually.
Some people might say that it is being done:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDCwrbqHfTM
The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms
I hope you are not serious. Interesting but non relevant.
This worries me when you give a blanket denial with no explanation.
Why is it not serious? If we can make computer language out of
stuff, then why would it not follow that computation is an emergent
property of stuff?
Then you need to change the definition of computation". I use it in
its standard sense, the one notion discovered by Babbage, Church,
Post, Turing, and Markov.
The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms
as easily as physics can be derived from sensible numbers.
Physics is not yet extracted, only the or some quantum
tautologies, and that was not that much easy, at least for me ...
But the principle of the possibility is not difficult, at least,
not for anyone who has ever programmed a player-missile graphic/
avatar/collision detection in a game.
On the contrary. Hmm... I see you have not yet grasped the main UDA
points.
I don't see the connection to UDA. I'm talking about the common
sense understanding in which programmed rules can be metaphorically
rendered to resemble physics.
That is not extracting physics from the statistical interference of
all computations. That is the metaphorical use of comp, which is out
of my topic.
Even if the physicist find a dimple equation or program emulating
the physical universe, to extract both the quanta and the qualia, we
have to derive physics explicitly from ... sense. That is why sense
if fundamental.
That's what I'm saying. If you want to reduce everything to physics,
you need quanta + public facing sense. If you want to reduce
everything to information, you need quanta + private sense.
Well, using 1p information, which is not "information" in the Shannon
sense, nor the quantum sense.
If you want to reduce sense, you can't do it, but you can reduce
quanta/information to sense as public facing sense - private sense.
We agree on this: physics must be derived from sense. this is
explained both in UDA, and exploited in AUDA. But we start from comp,
not non-comp.
But to derive physics from first person sense is not easy at all,
and to understand this you have first to understand how sense is
derived from arithmetic.
Sure it's not easy, because you have to invent a shadow of sense
that can be described in arithmetic, and then make yourself forget
that it is only a description of some logical/modal consequences of
sense.
No, I study and listen to the machine. The modal things are
mathematical tools simplifying the use of the machine's talk and
experience (at least in the S4 classical sense that we get with the
theaetetus' idea).
Keep in mind that with comp, physics does not involve one particular
computation, but all computations at once.
I would hope so.
May be one day you will love comp!
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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