On 07 Feb 2014, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, February 7, 2014 11:52:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Feb 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/6/2014 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when
machine looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot
avoid some private transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic,
with standard definition for transcendence.
I think the standard definition is "beyond normal experience", but
I think you mean "true but unprovable".
"True and unprovable" is "only" G* minus G. But "the private
transcendence" is a more complex phenomenon in which Z* minus Z and
X* minus X participate.
But even if you take transcendent to mean ineffable I don't see how
arithmetic is going to pick out the qualia of experience as
ineffable.
The hope is that X1* is a quantum logic à la John Bell (the
logician, not the physicist), already used to model a notion of
qualia, by proximity relations on "perceptible fields".
There are infinitely many true but unprovable propositions. Why
are the qualia we experience the ones that they are and not some
others?
Because the one that they are probably maximizes the probability to
eat, and minimizes the probability to be eaten.
That just makes it the qualia of the gaps.
That would be the case if the question was "why qualia?", and not "why
this or that qualia?" as Brent was asking.
The qualia itself should be explained by the logic of one of the
hypostases (X1*).
Bruno
You can't negatively assert positive identities like blue or itchy.
Neither one would minimize or maximize anything inherently. If they
had an implicit function like that, then there would be no reason
for them anyhow as a regular quantitative value could be used
instead. We don't live in a universe where qualia appears wherever a
function implies that it would be convenient.
Craig
Insects color qualia are probably quite different, because it is
driven by the sexual strategy of plants.
Bruno
Brent
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