On Thursday, February 6, 2014 11:22:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 05 Feb 2014, at 20:29, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 12:53:56 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 05 Feb 2014, at 13:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 5, 2014 4:37:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 04 Feb 2014, at 18:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> Numbers can be derived from sensible physics >>> >>> >>> That is a claim often done, but nobody has ever succeed without assuming >>> Turing universality (and thus the numbers) in their description of physics. >>> >> >> Turing universality can just be a property of physics, like density or >> mass. >> >> >> That is close to just nonsense (but I agree that some notorious >> physicists are attracted to this, but they don't convince me). >> > > Can you explain why? > > > Because Turing universality is a mathematical notion. > > It has nothing to do with physics. But physics can implement them, and > that notion is not that obvious. >
How do you know it has nothing to do with physics? Certainly it seems more plausible to me that Turing universality supervenes on a common language of physical unity and unit-plurality than it does that the flavor of a tangerine supervenes on Turing universality. > > > > > >> >> >> >> Just as Comp does a brute appropriation of qualia under 1p uncertainty, >> >> >> No. That would be a confusion between []p and []p & p (or others). >> >> Only God can do that confusion. >> > > You seem to go back and forth between making qualia something transcendent > and private, to making it somehow inevitable mathematically. > > > Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when machine > looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot avoid some private > transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic, with standard definition for > transcendence. > What's a standard definition for transcendence? How do you know that such a condition is not a 1 dimensional data transformation rather than an introspective aesthetic environment? > > > If we ask ourselves, 'Does being a good mathematician require you to be a > good artist or musician?', the answer I think is no. > > > I am not sure. But "good mathematician" is vague. "Good artist" also. > Just in simple, straightforward terms - does being able to multiply fractions require that you can paint a realistic face or does it seem to be a fundamentally different talent? > > > If we ask 'Does being a good artist or musician require us to be a good > mathematician?' the answer is also no. Why is the relation between math, > physics, and science so obvious, > > > Such relation are not obvious. That is why we discuss them. Indeed comp > changes them radically. > Comp would change them if it were correct. I am using the fact of their colloquial relation as support for Comp being misguided. > > > > but the relation between any of those and the arts is not so obvious? > > > > because to add numbers you need few bytes. To pain Mona Lisa, you nee much > more bytes, and richer 1p experiences. > It doesn't follow though that more math would equal 'unlike math' - at least not without a theory of why math would become unlike itself and what that would mean. > > > > >> >> >> >> physics can do a brute appropriation of arithmetic under material >> topology. >> >> >> Some material disposition can be shown to be Turing universal. But this >> is proved in showing how such system can implement a universal machine >> (quantum or not quantum one). >> > > Don't you just have to go to a level of description where the material > appears granular. I don't really get the argument that all matter is > computable but not all computation can be materialized. > > > Comp implies that matter is not computable. "materialization" is an > emergent phenomenon on coherence conditions on infinite sum of computations. > Why wouldn't you still be able to materialize any infinite sum of computations? > > > > > > >> >> >> >> It would explain why Turing universality does not apply to gases >> >> >> It applies to gases. technically no usable, as it is hard to put all the >> gaz molecules >> > > Not talking about gas molecules, I'm talking about a volume of ideal gas. > > >> at the right position at the right time, but in principle, gases, in some >> volume, are Turing universal system. >> > > You would need to control that volume with non-gaseous containers and > valves. Gas is still not Turing universal as an uncontained ideal gas. > Computation requires formal, object-like units...because arithmetic is not > really universal, it is only low level. > > >> >> and empty space. >> >> >> Hmm... Quantum vacuum is Turing universal. I think. >> > > I'm talking about an ideal vacuum though, not the vacuum that we imagine > is full of particle-waves or probability juice. If I'm right about the > sense primitive, energy exists only within matter, and not in space. > > >> >> For classical physics, you need at least three bodies. >> >> >> >> Computers require object-like properties to control and measure digitally. >> >> >> Yes. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> You often say, "we can do that", but this makes sense only if you do it >>> actually. >>> >> >> Some people might say that it is being done: >> >> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDCwrbqHfTM >> The Future of Computing -- Reuniting Bits and Atoms >> >> >> >> I hope you are not serious. Interesting but non relevant. >> > > This worries me when you give a blanket denial with no explanation. Why is > it not serious? If we can make computer language out of stuff, then why > would it not follow that computation is an emergent property of stuff? > > > > Then you need to change the definition of computation". I use it in its > standard sense, the one notion discovered by Babbage, Church, Post, > Turing, and Markov. > What would the definition of computation have to change to? They are calling what I'm talking about embodied computation - but it still delivers the same result. > > > > > >> >> >> >> The Future of Computing — Reuniting Bits and Atoms >> >>> >>> >>> >>> as easily as physics can be derived from sensible numbers. >>> >>> >>> Physics is not yet extracted, only the or some quantum tautologies, and >>> that was not that much easy, at least for me ... >>> >> >> But the principle of the possibility is not difficult, at least, not for >> anyone who has ever programmed a player-missile graphic/avatar/collision >> detection in a game. >> >> >> On the contrary. Hmm... I see you have not yet grasped the main UDA >> points. >> > > I don't see the connection to UDA. I'm talking about the common sense > understanding in which programmed rules can be metaphorically rendered to > resemble physics. > > > That is not extracting physics from the statistical interference of all > computations. That is the metaphorical use of comp, which is out of my > topic. > It's not metaphorical use of comp, it's the idea of the Matrix/simulation. Code comes in, and physics appears to appear inside. > > > > >> Even if the physicist find a dimple equation or program emulating the >> physical universe, to extract both the quanta and the qualia, we have to >> derive physics explicitly from ... sense. That is why sense if fundamental. >> >> > > That's what I'm saying. If you want to reduce everything to physics, you > need quanta + public facing sense. If you want to reduce everything to > information, you need quanta + private sense. > > > Well, using 1p information, which is not "information" in the Shannon > sense, nor the quantum sense. > I think we can conceive of both Shannon information and non-information in 1p. > > > > If you want to reduce sense, you can't do it, but you can reduce > quanta/information to sense as public facing sense - private sense. > > > We agree on this: physics must be derived from sense. this is explained > both in UDA, and exploited in AUDA. But we start from comp, not non-comp. > I'm saying that physics is derived from sense, and so is comp. Sense both comp, non-comp, and the capacity to discern the two. > > > > >> But to derive physics from first person sense is not easy at all, and to >> understand this you have first to understand how sense is derived from >> arithmetic. >> > > Sure it's not easy, because you have to invent a shadow of sense that can > be described in arithmetic, and then make yourself forget that it is only a > description of some logical/modal consequences of sense. > > > No, I study and listen to the machine. The modal things are mathematical > tools simplifying the use of the machine's talk and experience (at least in > the S4 classical sense that we get with the theaetetus' idea). > I don't think that you have given me any reason why I should accept that a machine has experience. > > > > > >> >> Keep in mind that with comp, physics does not involve one particular >> computation, but all computations at once. >> > > I would hope so. > > > May be one day you will love comp! > Maybe, but not for the reasons I have heard so far. Craig > > Bruno > > > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
