On Saturday, February 8, 2014 3:31:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 07 Feb 2014, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 7, 2014 11:52:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 06 Feb 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 2/6/2014 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when machine >> looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot avoid some private >> transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic, with standard definition for >> transcendence. >> >> >> I think the standard definition is "beyond normal experience", but I >> think you mean "true but unprovable". >> >> >> "True and unprovable" is "only" G* minus G. But "the private >> transcendence" is a more complex phenomenon in which Z* minus Z and X* >> minus X participate. >> >> >> >> >> But even if you take transcendent to mean ineffable I don't see how >> arithmetic is going to pick out the qualia of experience as ineffable. >> >> >> The hope is that X1* is a quantum logic à la John Bell (the logician, not >> the physicist), already used to model a notion of qualia, by proximity >> relations on "perceptible fields". >> >> >> >> >> There are infinitely many true but unprovable propositions. Why are >> the qualia we experience the ones that they are and not some others? >> >> >> Because the one that they are probably maximizes the probability to eat, >> and minimizes the probability to be eaten. >> > > That just makes it the qualia of the gaps. > > > That would be the case if the question was "why qualia?", and not "why > *this* or *that* qualia?" as Brent was asking. >
Each quale can be understood to be the personal presence of the total proprietary significance, while quanta (numbers, arithmetic, relations) can be understood to be the impersonal presence of the locally genericized qualia. Private experience is a subset of total experience. Public experience is a relativistically genericized collection of shared private experiences. The qualia itself should be explained by the logic of one of the hypostases > (X1*). > It should be, but I do not think that it is. I think that any of the hypostases could be explained by non-qualia. We don't have to explain imaginary numbers as being qualia, they can just be hypothetical. I don't see any reason why all quantitative properties could not exist just as well in a universe which completely lacks any kind of aesthetic presentation. Just as we can calculate geometry problems arithmetically without drawing lines and shapes, it makes no sense to me that any of the hypostases could positively affirm the specific nature of qualia. Craig > Bruno > > > You can't negatively assert positive identities like blue or itchy. > Neither one would minimize or maximize anything inherently. If they had an > implicit function like that, then there would be no reason for them anyhow > as a regular quantitative value could be used instead. We don't live in a > universe where qualia appears wherever a function implies that it would be > convenient. > > Craig > > >> >> Insects color qualia are probably quite different, because it is driven >> by the sexual strategy of plants. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
