On 06 Feb 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/6/2014 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes. But it is not a back and forth. It just happen that when machine looks inward, and "stay honest" with herself, she cannot avoid some private transcendence. It is a theorem of arithmetic, with standard definition for transcendence.

I think the standard definition is "beyond normal experience", but I think you mean "true but unprovable".

"True and unprovable" is "only" G* minus G. But "the private transcendence" is a more complex phenomenon in which Z* minus Z and X* minus X participate.




But even if you take transcendent to mean ineffable I don't see how arithmetic is going to pick out the qualia of experience as ineffable.

The hope is that X1* is a quantum logic à la John Bell (the logician, not the physicist), already used to model a notion of qualia, by proximity relations on "perceptible fields".




There are infinitely many true but unprovable propositions. Why are the qualia we experience the ones that they are and not some others?

Because the one that they are probably maximizes the probability to eat, and minimizes the probability to be eaten.

Insects color qualia are probably quite different, because it is driven by the sexual strategy of plants.

Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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