On 07 Mar 2014, at 01:14, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 03:41:51PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/6/2014 3:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 04:48:37PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
For example, a brain cannot think. Brain activity cannot think, a
computer cannot think, a computation cannot think, I would say.
This issue causes people a lot of problems. It does not matter for
the
purposes of UDA 1-7, but for step 8 is important. The issue is
probably best handled using the concept of (COMP) supervenience -
consciousness supervenes on the running of a program on a given
reference machine. That machine and the running of the program can
be
quite abstract, of course, which is something people find hard to
get,
but is perfectly fine for the concept of supervenience.
How is that different than saying a given machine performing a
certain computation is thinking? Bruno seems to be saying that no
matter whether it's abstract or concrete it's a 3p notion and so
cannot be thinking. When I've asked Bruno what it takes, on his
theory, for a machine to be conscious, he has answered that it be
Lobian, which is an attribute of the functions it can compute and
which seems 3p to me.
I did, at one stage, get Bruno to agree with me that "a program is
conscious" is shorthand for "consciousness supervenes on a running
program of some reference machine".
In such a way, one should also say that a "brain is conscious" (or
thinking) is shorthand for the "consciousness supervenes on a brain".
OK. And then, when those things are clear, we allow ourself to use
shorter description.
of course we need to re-explain the nuances when new-bes arrive ...
What Bruno purports to show is that consciousness cannot supervene on
a "primitive physical reality",
Well, in MGA (or UDA1-7 and a stringer Occam). But that was not the
topic here, I think. here it is just that consciousness is not a 3p
attribute, but an 1p attribute, and so cannot been identified, a bit
like orange and apple. It is less deep that the fact that there is no
primitive physical reality. After all, we do have a primitive 3p
reality with comp, like the numbers.
whereas what I think is really shown
is that observed physical reality (ie phenomena) cannot be
primitive.
? (I agree with this).
Phenomena must be derivable from properties of computation.
OK.
What is not shown by the MGA (and if it did, it would be empirically
invalidated) is that consciousness does not supervene on physical
reality.
?
Consciousness can supervene on a physically real brain. If not we
would not say "yes" to a doctor.
Brains are part of phenomena, and indeed, it would appear
(empirically) that consciousness does supervene on brains.
Most plausibly. Especially on the generalized brain, and that is used
in the reasoning.
More on this no doubt when I get to write my fabled paper on the
MGA. Sorry for so many vaccuous promises - but I really have several
projects ahead of it in the queue, so I cannot promise when I'll get
to it.
Take it easy. It is a subtle complex subject, where we can be deluded
easily by intuition and natural language.
Our brain are not really programmed for that task.
Bruno
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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