On Thursday, March 6, 2014 3:48:37 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Mar 2014, at 09:51, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Thursday, March 6, 2014 8:31:29 AM UTC, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> On Thursday, March 6, 2014 8:06:19 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 05 Mar 2014, at 22:15, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Monday, March 3, 2014 6:53:16 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 02 Mar 2014, at 19:53, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, March 2, 2014 4:34:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 02 Mar 2014, at 13:36, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> > So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that it >>>>> >>>>> > is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it stop >>>>> >>>>> > being about motivation and becomes that we can't think straight? ass >>>>> > >>>>> > Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks >>>>> > to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on >>>>> > (strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab over >>>>> >>>>> > days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't return >>>>> >>>>> > to normal until all the REM is made up for) >>>>> > i >>>>> > Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue >>>>> > to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging >>>>> > ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc >>>>> > kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such >>>>> >>>>> > that 'a change is as good as a rest'. >>>>> > ion >>>>> > If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious >>>>> > in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the >>>>> > heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs >>>>> >>>>> > where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with >>>>> >>>>> > our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I >>>>> > experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what >>>>> > object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable? >>>>> >>>>> > If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him? >>>>> > >>>>> > If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness >>>>> > experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically >>>>> > conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which >>>>> > hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of >>>>> > software, such that the experience is able to think the next >>>>> > thought? The processor? RAM? >>>>> > >>>>> > Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running, >>>>> >>>>> > and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware >>>>> >>>>> > can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it >>>>> > be updated to include predictions for what an emergent consciousness >>>>> >>>>> > would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If computation is >>>>> > intrinsically consciousness why can we account for the footprint of >>>>> >>>>> > our code, purely in terms of, and exactly >>>>> > of that code? >>>>> > , >>>>> > Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over the >>>>> >>>>> > past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at all >>>>> > having been done in this area, for all we know when the computer >>>>> > runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a darling little >>>>> >>>>> > consciousness flashing into existence and struggling to survive, >>>>> > only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton performance tuner? Why >>>>> >>>>> > is even a chance of that acceptable...why hasn't any work been done >>>>> >>>>> > on the footprint issue? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A remarkable set of interesting questions ghibbsa. >>>>> >>>>> And then, UDA makes things worse, as it adds to the task of explaining >>>>> >>>>> consciousness, when assuming its digital invariance, the derivation of >>>>> >>>>> the beliefs in the physical laws, in arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> I submit a problem. Then the translation of that problem in arithmetic >>>>> >>>>> suggest the following answer. >>>>> >>>>> Computation is not intrinsically consciousness. Consciousness is not >>>>> an attribute of computation. Consciousness is an attribute of a >>>>> person, a first person notion. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Would you agree you've said many times that it is? Consciousness >>>> intrinsic of computation? >>>> >>>> >>>> You will not find one quote. On the contrary I insist on the contrary. >>>> Consciousness is an attribute of person, and they exist in Platonia, out >>>> of >>>> time and space and physics, which arises from their views from inside. >>>> It is very simple: you cannot equate a first person notion, like >>>> consciousness, and *any* third person notions. With comp, we almost equate >>>> it when saying yes to the doctor, but we don't it "affirmatively", we do >>>> it >>>> because we *hope* we get a level right, but the theory will explain that >>>> we >>>> are "invoking God" implicitly in the process, and that is why I insist it >>>> is a theology. >>>> >>> >>> Fair enough Bruno - I got that wrong then. >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> I was very sure, but I'm too lazy to go look, since intuitively I do >>> totally trust your word. However, like me you may be a bit mad, in which >>> case, if I do see a quote I'll be sure to come get you! >>> >>> >>> Well, that might not been enough. I might have indeed use expression >>> like "a machine can think" or even "computation can be conscious" in some >>> context, as a shortening for "a machine can support consciousness", or "a >>> computation can make possible for a conscious person to manifest itself >>> relatively to some environment". >>> >>> The basic rule is simple: we cannot identify any 1p thing with any 3p >>> thing. The nice happening in AUDA, is that we can understand from the math >>> that impossibility in a complete 3p view. That is: we can explain in the >>> usual 3p scientific mode why there is an 1p, different from the 3p body, >>> and different from any 3p notion, without needing to commit ourself to an >>> ontological dualism. The dualism involved is purely epistemological, but >>> shown unavoidable for any self-referentially correct machines or relative >>> numbers. >>> >>> Note that Kripke himself, using modal logic, already provided an >>> argument against the brain-mind identity thesis, notably in his book >>> "Naming and Necessity". >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> Fair enough....but can I just say my most recent memory, which is very >> partial and devoid of context...just a few shards of shattered glass >> really. The only point of it, would be if it jogged your memory saying it, >> which allowed you to explain. There's a strong possibility my memory was >> someone else not you so not to worry if you're sure you didn't say it. >> >> So my memory shard for context is that....things turned to what I thought >> was the matter of computation and whether it was intrinsically conscious. >> >> I don't remember how the too and fro happened, but at some stage, another >> memory shard is that, I interpreted, you responded affirmatively to >> computation intrinsically consciousness question (asked by me or someone) >> >> my memory shard for what you said is something like - and this is likely >> paraphrase "they seem different"...."little pieces of computation..." >> ....."but in a real way...."...."...they are like us....",..."conscious". >> >> So as I remembered it, all together something like "computation is >> intrinsically conscious or proto-conscious, computation is like us but >> maybe more primitive or primordial, but nevertheless directly related, and >> in some sense that is significant and meaningful they are conscious...even >> if it's nothing so sophisticated as our own,...a definite relation though" >> >> That's my most recent memory Bruno. Maybe it wasn't you. Maybe I >> misinterpreted at the time. Maybe I misremembered. But that's a >> memory....which stayed with me....because basically it was something I felt >> profoundly at odds with, but had no expression at the time, or means, to >> challenge, or felt not. >> >> If that jogs anything, positively....maybe I'll bother doing some google >> groups searches. not sure how that service runs. Hopefully it's better than >> yahoo's effort tee hee. bound to be. >> > > > Bruno - scrap the above. > > > OK. > > > > I wasn't thinking clearly. I don't know why I'm bothering you or me with > a 'shard' memory. You're explaining the sense you would mean it to me > above. Therefore it doesn't matter what wording was used in the past, > beyond the sort of input a high school English teacher would have into this > :O) > > Instead of the above, can I request some context, in terms of what other > people that are your peers, think as to this. For example, the guy that > said something like "consciousness is what code feels like to be processed". > > Would you say that statement implies a belief computation is trinsically > conscious? > > > "consciousness is what code feels like to be processed" might, or not, > convey the right thing. It is hard to say without some context. > > Usually I prefer to avoid such sentences, as they can be misleading. It > might gives the feeling that "consciousness" is attributed to some 3p > activity of some programs, when it can only be attributed to an abstract > first person which might consciousness is made manifestable relatively to > you through that processing. > > Then later, we can express this shortly by an expression like > ""consciousness is what code feels like to be processed", as a sort of > metaphor. > > If fact I might ask you what do you mean by "consciousness is what code > feels like to be processed", and actually I might ask you if you agree that > > "yes doctor" implies "consciousness is what code feels like to be > processed" > > and/or > > "consciousness is what code feels like to be processed" implies "yes > doctor", > Well I was obviously thinking that it does. I wouldn't have gone to all that trouble if I only thought that you thought it. No point that alone. People think what they think, and they get what they get. No but I think comp as you define it, saying yes to the doctor, requires computation to be intrinsically consciousness to be begin with. Because its only then that you can assume a process, that if you could stick the toaster lead up someone's nose, and instead of toast get a printout of the human brain as e, you could save it to a USB stick, and transfer it to the computer shaped similar to brain to avoid rattling and vibration. Consciousness has to be what code feels like to be processes for that to be a reasonable, competent thing to do. On the other hand if consciousness is unconnected with computation, other than the computational principle says consciousness is wholly computational. If that's the status . of things. Then, assuming computationalism is correct, there are now two unknowns. The true/complete nature of computationalism, and the laws governing it. And the true/complete nature of consciousness and the laws governing that. Clearly, the principle is true, one will be a subset of the other. Presumably the subset will eventually be consciousness. But you'd have some explaining to do in logic and basic good sense, to build huge bias into the analytical process, from the start, that for no reason other than a hodgepodge of habit, convention (of that field), personal preference and academic history, that computation as the computer hardware and software that was basically our first attempt, is bestowed perfection and correctness. Anid consciousness - which is like infinitely more profound in its implications, and more baffling to us. and inexplicable....than computing. And evolved with specific structural - profoundly structural - . That it's reasonable or competent to set things up that its built in that there can be nothing interesting for computationalism to learn in the process. Things this huge cannot just be assumed this way. You need a complete theory for each of the assumptionhs and judgement calls you're making there. Because these are assumptions about the nature of reality. And that's what we're in the process to be discovering. her Explain what's wrong or inferior about the definition of comp that reads "....conciousness is computational in nature as such share the same nature. Ib the fial ordering, consciousness will be a subset of computationalism, but because it is currently not proven how complete our concept of computationalism as it stands, whether there are details missing, or details incomplete, it cannot be ruled out that discoveries that shed light on consciousness may also shed shed new light on computationalism, as well as vice verca. Therefore until there is scientific proof, consciousness and computationalism will be regarded as two partially unknown, but fundamentally connected objects, that will need t, be discovered as a pair, one bouncing off the other" it's verbose, I'll give you that. But is it the better, more scientific, more reasonable - less and smaller assumption laden - way to go? To sign off. It's isn't legitimate now, to say this is assuming not-comp. Because your definition and status you give it, has been drawn into question. Legitimately . And you have no case that I've ever seen that computationalism could not be very different than we currently understand, yet nevertheless fundamentally and undiluted COMPUTATIONALISM.
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