On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, [email protected] wrote:
On Thursday, March 20, 2014 6:26:53 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, [email protected] wrote:
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, [email protected] wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, [email protected] wrote:
I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that
has any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a
problem, and reduce one problem into another.ia
Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it
worked - has been understood. I also differ on the idea that
philosophy - which is pre-scientific or non-scientific - can
explain science. The problem is that logically....just the act of
doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that philosophy *can*
explain science. I mean....do you really think that if, as it
turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing
philosophy on science would actually reveal that? no! the
philosopher would find an explanation.
So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the
question.
I can agree. I don't believe in "philosophy". Nor do I really
believe in "science". I believe in scientific attitude, and it has
no relation with the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more
scientific than some astronomers.
The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy,
"science" is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its
God (very often a primitive physical universe), etc.
There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension
of philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp,
whether explicitly or by default.
Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without
rigor, of science.
The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound,
happened with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved.
With science and with "conscience", I can agree with that. In the
comp theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The
singling out of the "[]", from the arithmetical reality.
Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second
camp. Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one.
I might feel to be more in "the second camp" myself, except that
precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow.
You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or
to the UDA, or to AUDA?
Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the
wider matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a
part of it.
Thanks for reassuring me.
I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated
that I can't get you to see what I am saying.
We might be closer than you thought, especially from above.
But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that
you talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch
type about 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm
sorry if that is conveying an impression of not being happy. It
isn't the case I assure you. If I was unhappy, or I thought you
were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe me anything...I'd consider
it very rude to put emotional shit onto you.
OK. No problem.
I just try sincerely to understand your point.
I know
OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded
scientist. I understand only mathematical theories, and, when
applied, I believe to criterion of testability, or to the
simplification they provide to already tested theories.
?
Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science
standard.
These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in
philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part
that matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of
the refutation.
I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument.
I wrote for you....because I thought you'd get it.
I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different
meaning from one university to another one).
How many different methodologies are used in the course of
producing all those definitions?
If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the
differences in method only count at the core.
?
On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or
gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude,
which, beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an
attitude of doubt, and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues.
But that would quite rightly be regarded as a philosophical position
Bruno. All we are doing is playing around with word definitions. You
are saying that your philosophy of science is that it is....what you
say above.
No, it is just some vague precision on the meaning of the term
implicitly or explicitly accepted but scientist.
It is not a philosophical position, it is an axiom on science on which
I was hoping you could accept, if only most of this will (often
vacuously true) when the "science" of the ideally self-referentially
correct machine will be shown played by the beweisbar predicate in
arithmetic.
I keep my philosophical position for myself, especially in such
complex field.
So if that's your hunch the question becomes..are there any
definitions not derived from creative analysis? Are there any that
define how the different definitions should be analysed, compared,
and the superior model selected
Which - not Unhappy with you about it - but I'm frequently on
record that it's easy to make as much as you want "Science" if you
define science philosophically.
I do science. I don't define science, except in some abstract way,
in the frame of the study of the self-referentially correct
machines, when the machine proves propositions about itself. But
this is "science" in a way similar that the sun is a material point
having the right mass. But you must not confuse the two level
That's a valid philosophical position.
Are you dreaming or what?
I can accept this as vacuously true. All scientists does philosophy
all the time, and that's true.
When a baby develops the belief in theories like Daddy and Mommy: that
is science.
But for the nature of science to be fundamentally not philosophical
there would have to be some fundament reason why, no? Because
philosophy is just human being thinking about the nature of the
world in a deep, methodical way.
I don't know what is meant by the term philosophy, except in the sense
of philosophy of life, with seems to me more a private thing than
anything else.
A good scientist *is* a good philosopher.
A lot of human science would improve in "scientificity" by only adding
"interrogation mark" in some places.
To me all domain can be aboard with a scientific attitude. It is not a
philosophical position, but an epistemological conjecture.
Accepting some "philosophical" position, but which I think are more
theological or spiritual, like saying "yes", or "no" to the doctor, we
can use this or that mathematical tools provides by the hypothesis.
'v
But all that's about is lowering the standard to philosophy or
theology or whatever. accomplished the some thing as Deutsch.
On the contrary, computationalism invites the use of computer
science mathematical logic for making higher the level of rigor,
and clarifying a lot very difficult points. I might think that all
errors in philosophy and theology are confusion between some of the
8 hypostases.
OK but if one of the results is that science is different in kind,
there has to be a fundamental divide. What is it?
It would be long to explain, so I sum up a lot, and take the risk to
be slightly incorrect to be enough short.
What happens is that when the machine introspect it eventually
distinguish and justifies 8 (actually much more) fundamental personal
points of view, and that they organize the arithmetical reality in
seemingly very different ways. They
p (truth of p)
[]p (belief by a Löbian number, Gödel's beweisbar arithmetical
predicate )
[]p & p (Knowledge of the machine)
[]p & <>t (intelligible observable)
[]p & <>t & p (sensible observable)
They are 8, because three of them inherits the splitting of G and G*,
which indeed "think" different on the consistency <>t question, in a
nice way which explains why both are still right, despite thiunking
differently (G* proves <>t, G does not). That is due to the indexical
nature of the modalities.
I translate a problem in "philosophy" (the mind-body problem) into a
problem of arithmetic. That's all.
can you mention one characteristic of science that cannot,
fundamentally cannot, be philosophical in its explanation?
No, I can't. If your point is that in science we do philosophy, or
even theology, I totally agree with you.
I think
For this you *need* a limitatation of philosophy to refer to.
With my definition/view, science is when we do not commit ourself in
any ontological commitment other than the intended meaning of the
terms in the theory. But for physics, such meaning depends of comp or
not-comp. You can do "philosophy of mind" in that sense, and be
precise and clear, and reason validly.
Most physicists are good philosopher as they don't publicly commit
themselves ontologically in a public. Be it a Creator, or a Creation.
I don't believe in precise boundaries between many disciplines, and
the scientific attitude is almost the attitude of those naive enough
to try wrong ideas again and again.
In theology, the most fundamental science (by definition I would say),
progresses are slow, and error are easily hidden by the authorities,
and well, you have to be patient for more public studies.
The logic of (boolean) "Science" (of the classical platonist self-
introspective machine or number) can be shown characterized by the
modal logic G.
"The theology of such machine or number, that is the truth about the
machine, not just her science (her justifiable beliefs) can be shown
characterized by the modal logic G*.
There is no limitation to serious philosophy. It is science, when done
respecting some common sense rule of politeness, or respect, or
admissibility of self-error.
Natural science and naturalist metaphysics can both be done seriously,
we can be rigorous/polite on all level, but better not to hide the
possible incompatibilities between some assumptions.
When I said, "I do science", I did not say "I don't philosophy".
Computationalism illustrates the existence of a large non empty
intersection between science and philosophy (and theology).
Bruno
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