On Saturday, March 22, 2014 8:35:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Thursday, March 20, 2014 6:26:53 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Mar 2014, at 21:21, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 9:19:52 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 17 Mar 2014, at 23:19, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:46:23 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:03, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> I am not sure if I have any clue where we would differ, nor if that has >>> any relevance with the reasoning I suggest, to formulate a problem, and >>> reduce one problem into another.ia >>> >>> >>> Well, I do differ in general on the view that Science - why it worked - >>> has been understood. I also differ on the idea that philosophy - which is >>> pre-scientific or non-scientific - can explain science. The problem is that >>> logically....just the act of doing philosophy on science, pre-assumes that >>> philosophy *can* explain science. I mean....do you really think that if, as >>> it turned out, philosophy cahnnot explain science, that doing philosophy on >>> science would actually reveal that? no! the philosopher would find an >>> explanation. >>> >>> So just doing philosophy on science pre-assumes the answer to the >>> question. >>> >>> >>> I can agree. I don't believe in "philosophy". Nor do I really believe in >>> "science". I believe in scientific attitude, and it has no relation with >>> the domaon involved. Some astrolog can be more scientific than some >>> astronomers. >>> >>> The problem is that since theology has been excluded from academy, >>> "science" is presented very often as a pseudo-theology, with its God (very >>> often a primitive physical universe), etc. >>> >>> >>> >>> There's two camps Bruno. One is that science was just an extension of >>> philosophy, among other things. Almost everyone is in this camp, whether >>> explicitly or by default. >>> >>> >>> Many believe that philosophy is an extension, sometimes without rigor, >>> of science. >>> >>> >>> >>> The other camp is that something fundamental, and profound, happened >>> with science, that is extremely mysterious and unresolved. >>> >>> >>> With science and with "conscience", I can agree with that. In the comp >>> theory, it is the birth of the universal (Löbian) machine. The singling out >>> of the "[]", from the arithmetical reality. >>> >>> >>> >>> Membership of either camp is an act of faith. I'm in the second camp. >>> Sometimes I wonder if I'm the only one. >>> >>> >>> I might feel to be more in "the second camp" myself, except that >>> precisely here, computationalism explains what happens, somehow. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> You do look unhappy with something, apparently related to comp, or to >>> the UDA, or to AUDA? >>> >>> >>> Absolutely not. I've recently concluded my personal work on the wider >>> matter. It's been hugely valuable. Talking to you has been a part of it. >>> >>> >>> Thanks for reassuring me. >>> >>> >>> >>> I would like to give you something back...maybe I feel frustrated that I >>> can't get you to see what I am saying. >>> >>> >>> We might be closer than you thought, especially from above. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> But never unhappy with you or your work. I'm very appreciative that you >>> talk to me at all. I'm not careful with what I say. I touch type about >>> 100wpm and rarely check what I said before posting. I'm sorry if that is >>> conveying an impression of not being happy. It isn't the case I assure you. >>> If I was unhappy, or I thought you were, I'd leave you alone. You don't owe >>> me anything...I'd consider it very rude to put emotional shit onto you. >>> >>> >>> OK. No problem. >>> >>> >>> >>> I just try sincerely to understand your point. >>> >>> >>> I know >>> >>> >>> OK. Keep in mind, that I am really a sort of simple minded scientist. I >>> understand only mathematical theories, and, when applied, I believe to >>> criterion of testability, or to the simplification they provide to already >>> tested theories. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ? >>> Case is both mathematic standard, and theoretical computer science >>> standard. >>> >>> >>> These aren't the parts that matter. It's possible to use math in >>> philosophy. It's possible to do philosophy of computing. The part that >>> matters is the analysis of the philosophy and the nature of the refutation. >>> >>> I didn't write the refutation to be a proper standard of argument. I >>> wrote for you....because I thought you'd get it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I would not classify this as philosophy (a word which has different >>> meaning from one university to another one). >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all >> those definitions? >> >> If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in >> method only count at the core. >> >> >> >> ? >> >> On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or >> gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude, which, >> beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an attitude of doubt, >> and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues. >> > > But that would quite rightly be regarded as a philosophical position > Bruno. All we are doing is playing around with word definitions. You are > saying that your philosophy of science is that it is....what you say above. > > > No, it is just some vague precision on the meaning of the term implicitly > or explicitly accepted but scientist. > It's a philosophical positioning Bruno. All you do in your most recent line above, is formulate yet another form of words, which like all the others, presumably, seeks a convincing way to define philosophy, or science, such that one either is, or isn't, or neither are, or both. In just the last few posts you've defined the relationships - apparently anyway - about 3 ways, each next trivialising the former. You trying to define your way out of, what are, inherent and fundamental problems.
> It is not a philosophical position, it is an axiom on science on which I > was hoping you could accept, if only most of this will (often vacuously > true) when the "science" of the ideally self-referentially correct machine > will be shown played by the beweisbar predicate in arithmetic. > OK, let's just look at the components we have in play here, and the links between them. Let's assume point blank what you state above is 100% not philosophy. That's the component, then, of not-philosophy. We're talking about the nature of science so the component on the other side is 100% science that may or may not also be philosophy. So how do you attach these two components such that one defines the nature of the other. It's middle, joining, component that decides this Bruno. the joining component can be stated very generically and high level, but that carries the property of always being true regardless of what else is said too. It's a statement like "this defines the nature of that". And that is, and will always be, philosophical. You can define science and philosophy as heavily overlapping. You can define science as an overrated, misconception liced regional backwater of a grand philosophy, as Deutsch and Popper do. You can define things such that, the nature of science - that middle link joining something - that may be 100% scientif - on one side, to what is on the other side, which may be science, which may be 100% scientific and 0% philosophy. o But the link in the middle is defined - and intractably so - as your assertion, your option to select from any number of variations or completely different options. Your gift to choose. A philosophical positioning it's going to be the same issues through what else you say below, so I draw a line herfe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
