On 25 Mar 2014, at 07:45, [email protected] wrote:


On Saturday, March 22, 2014 8:35:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Mar 2014, at 16:25, [email protected] wrote:



How many different methodologies are used in the course of producing all those definitions?

If science is fundamentally different in 'kind' then the differences in method only count at the core.


?

On the contrary, science is not different in kind of philosophy, or gardening or whatever. Science is only a question of attitude, which, beyond curiosity and some taste for astonishment, is an attitude of doubt, and attempt to be clear enough for colleagues.

But that would quite rightly be regarded as a philosophical position Bruno. All we are doing is playing around with word definitions. You are saying that your philosophy of science is that it is....what you say above.

No, it is just some vague precision on the meaning of the term implicitly or explicitly accepted but scientist.

It's a philosophical positioning Bruno.

I don't see this. I think you are confuse the meta-level and the level of the inquiry. If not, could you tell me what is the philosophical positioning that you see, and how does it influence the reasoning?
May be you might explain what you mean by "philosophy".



All you do in your most recent line above, is formulate yet another form of words,

I really would prefer you quoting and exemplifying your saying, because you lost me here. Not sure I can even understand an expression like "formulate a form of words".



which like all the others, presumably, seeks a convincing way to define philosophy, or science, such that one either is, or isn't, or neither are, or both. In just the last few posts you've defined the relationships - apparently anyway - about 3 ways, each next trivialising the former. You trying to define your way out of, what are, inherent and fundamental problems.

Not at all, or in a trivial vacuously true sense. In our subject, it is difficult because both philosophy of mind is often done without the scientific method, and in the philosophical way, that is by defending some truth, or by using the intuitive meaning of terms, but this is not what I do, except for pedagogical purpose.





It is not a philosophical position, it is an axiom on science on which I was hoping you could accept, if only most of this will (often vacuously true) when the "science" of the ideally self- referentially correct machine will be shown played by the beweisbar predicate in arithmetic.

OK, let's just look at the components we have in play here, and the links between them. Let's assume point blank what you state above is 100% not philosophy.

here is the problem. It is can be 100% philosophy and at the same time 100% science, as they have a non empty intersection, unless you use some curriculum type of definition, in which case it is better to see it as science.



That's the component, then, of not-philosophy. We're talking about the nature of science so the component on the other side is 100% science that may or may not also be philosophy. So how do you attach these two components such that one defines the nature of the other. It's middle, joining, component that decides this Bruno. the joining component can be stated very generically and high level, but that carries the property of always being true regardless of what else is said too.

You lost me. It is too much inclear, I can interpret this in many ways.




It's a statement like "this defines the nature of that". And that is, and will always be, philosophical.

I don't see why. Are you like some philosophers pretending that some part of philosophy can never been handled by the scientific method?



You can define science and philosophy as heavily overlapping. You can define science as an overrated, misconception liced regional backwater of a grand philosophy, as Deutsch and Popper do.

I don't do that.



You can define things such that, the nature of science - that middle link joining something - that may be 100% scientif - on one side, to what is on the other side, which may be science, which may be 100% scientific and 0% philosophy.
o

You really lost me.




But the link in the middle is defined - and intractably so - as your assertion, your option to select from any number of variations or completely different options. Your gift to choose. A philosophical positioning

I don't understand. I don't see the philosophical positioning. I think you confuse the level and the metalevel of the theory. Science can be done without philosophy, that is, in a way such than any rationalist person can understand, even if he:she agrees or not with the assumption. The choice of the axioms can be done privately from philosophy or any personal reason, that nobody should be interested in, except the historian and the philosopher of science.

Basically, science is given, in the theoretical simplification of the ideally correct machine by the Gödel beweisbar (G); like theology can be seen in the G* (or G* minus G for the "proper theology"). But the term of philosophy is used in so much different sense, that I avoid it completely in the formal theory.






it's going to be the same issues through what else you say below, so I draw a line herfe

That will not help me to see your point. I have no clue which philosophical positioning you attribute to me. I try hard to void making them public, so I am interested.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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