On 09 May 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
Oops. I forgot to include the link: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.0126v1.pdf
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I don't buy it. For one thing memory IS lossy and it's largely
reconstruction. I think their argument only shows that cognition is
irreversible in a stat-mech sense. The implication for saying 'yes'
or 'no' to the doctor would be that substituting for a small part of
your brain might scramble your memories/peronality - but it would
still be in principle possible to replace your whole brain by a
equivalent Turing machine. But I question even that step. I think
one's consciousness is embedded and to some degree 'integrated' into
the world; it's this integration and reference to the world that
provides 'meaning'.
Brent
Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information
Using Algorithmic Information Theory
Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, Rebecca Maguire, Virgil Griffith
(Submitted on 1 May 2014)
In this article we review Tononi's (2008) theory of
consciousness as integrated information. We argue that previous
formalizations of integrated information (e.g. Griffith, 2014)
depend on information loss. Since lossy integration would
necessitate continuous damage to existing memories, we propose it is
more natural to frame consciousness as a lossless integrative
process and provide a formalization of this idea using algorithmic
information theory. We prove that complete lossless integration
requires noncomputable functions. This result implies that if
unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modelled computationally.
Only that last step is false, and it looks like they are aware of this
in the paper. Nothing inconsistent with comp, as consciousness per se
is not computable. The []p is computable (that's comp), but the []p &
p is not computable from that very point of view, not even definable.
It remains computable in some sense in the eyes of God, but even this
is not yet completely clear for me.
Consciousness does not involve a computation per se, but an abstract
knower which can eventually relate to "computations".
Brains do not produce consciousness, it stabilizes consciousness
making possible for a person to share computations with other
(conscious) machines. Consciousness is an immaterial reality in
Platonia, like a computation, that a machine can represent locally.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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