On 10 May 2014, at 06:17, LizR wrote:
I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and consciousness
arises somehow in a "materialist-type way" from the operation of the
brain, then consciousness will be computable by definition.
If physics is "computable" (turing emulable) then comp is true.
But:
If comp is true, then physics cannot be computable (a priori). Because
physics becomes a measure on infinities of computations, with a
"relatively random" selection process (the FPI).
Conclusion: if ohysics is computable, then physics is not computable.
Conclusion: physics is not computable. (with or without comp).
Consciousness is also something non computable, or non Turing
emulable, although it looks like comp say so.
But consciousness will not be an attribute of a machine only, but a
bit like Brent seems to say sometimes, it is a conjunction of what a
machine do (when she believes something) together with some truth, or
consistencies.
To say that a machine, by its 3p behavior, is conscious, is a bit like
saying that the []p is conscious or know something, but consciousness
or knowledge is more related to the []p & p, which the machine cannot
really define. It is the non nameable "inner god". It is your
intuitive "I", which is not definable by anything 3p, except that with
comp we bet that by saving the []p, and reinstalling it, we can save
both the []p and the []p & p. But that needs an act of faith (the yes
doctor).
Arithmetical truth, likewise, cannot be defined in arithmetic, and
consciousness is a sort of close parent of truth.
Bruno
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