On 13 May 2014, at 10:57, [email protected] wrote:
On Sunday, May 11, 2014 11:10:58 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 May 2014, at 10:51, [email protected] wrote:
On Sunday, May 11, 2014 8:46:41 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max
Tegmark discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his
conclusions are, if any). If physics is computable and
consciousness arises somehow in a "materialist-type way" from the
operation of the brain, then consciousness will be computable by
definition.
Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that
even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness.
If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics
with nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I
missing something obvious?
Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems
so trivial to disprove:
"even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a
computer could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain
matter, and not just a simulation, to generate the consciousness."
1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp)
2. brain generates consciousness but
3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then
4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp)
so comp = ~comp
I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot.
I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am
not afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so
apology for participating to the discussion with a shift.
What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with
comp (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes
consciousness to a computer implemented in a primitive physical
reality. Physics might be computable, in the sense that we can
predict the physical behavior, but IF primitive matter is necessary
for consciousness, then, although a virtual emulation would do
(with different matter), an abstract or arithmetical computation
would not do, by the lack of the primitive matter.
I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what
is the role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence,
which seems here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph
argument, or Maudlin's argument, give an idea that how much a
primitive matter use here becomes magical: almost like saying that
a computation is conscious if there is primitive matter and if God
is willing to make it so. We can always reify some "mystery" to
block an application of a theory to reality.
I think it's much more likely to be related to proximity.
Consciousness is happening somewhere.
That is ambiguous. What do you mean by somewhere?
There's nothing ambiguous. I am conscious...I make an observation
about my own consciousness. I observe it is integrated, convergent,
and - assuming it takes place in my brain - I conjecture it has the
properties of convergence.
The question is not about truth or false, but on accepting assuming
something an following the consequences.
Don't talk like if I was defending an opinion. I am a logician. I
study what can belief people and machines, notably about herself and
their possible universal neighbors.
I know that a major claim to science, that you believe you have,
I am only an humble machine theologian.
is that you use precise tools like modal logic.
You miss Gödel, Löb, Solovay, and thus Goldblatt, Visser.
But this is wrong, when the initial knowledge is absent,
Do you mean this by entailing we have say no the doctor at all levels?
Modal logic cannot create knowledge..
Hibbsa, you really don't study the work, and seems unaware of the
"miracle" made possible by the incompleteness phenomena.
Now we know that for all arithmetically sound machine believing in
Peano axioms, Theaetetus' defintion of knowledge provides an extension
of the most usual theory of knowledge (with the axiom []p -> p).
It is not the modal logic which creates knowledge, it is a more subtle
relation between computer and truth which creates "knowledge".
The logic of "[]p & p" in arithmetic, with [] for Gödel beweisbar
provides a knower, obeying to K, with the Grz axiom:
[]([](A -> []A) -> A) -> A ([]A -> A, and []A -> [][]A can be derived).
Modal logic does not need to create something, but to talk on
something, even sometimes, on something the machine has no name for,
because by the incompleteness, []p and []p & p obeys deeply different
laws.
it has to be there at the initialization.
That's perhaps like what I begin to think. All universal machine are
conscious.
All you do, Bruno, by using greater precision than you really have,
is obscure the level of true knowledge.
You can't be that unfair, ghibbsa. I recover the most accepted theory
of knowledge, the modal logic KT, or S4 (=KT4).
It is math. You must do the work. read Boolos 79, or Boloos 93. I have
new glass, succesfully working, and I can't exaggerate my appreciation
for Smorynski's book too. reference in the biblio of the thesis in my
url.
That isn't good. It might look good, but it's actually much worse
and much further from real science, than using appropriately vague
language if ...IF...that is a truer reflection of the actual
knowledge present.
Be modest. Ask me a precise question. You get it wrong if you didn't
see it is "hard science". I am the one supposed to ask a question, and
I make the question utterly clear by submitting it to the machines
different possible views on this.
I think I have anwered your other questions below more or less here.
I'm afraid you show that you have not study the work. Sorry. I don't
see any attempt by you to refute the point, but then it looks like you
attribute me pretense where I have not.
You seem to ignore that the modal logic G and G* are the correct modal
logic of arithmetically sound machine self-reference, and for non
trivial reason, we have to redeem the oldest definition of knowledge
"true opinion", and "true justified opinion".
Nobody has invented those logics. Those are non trivial mathematical
discoveries. That G and G* gives the provable and true discourse by
and about the machines or digital self-referential forms, is due to
Solovay.
Modal logics are just tools. They compress infinite dialogs we can
have with the machine.
Computer science does not make anything true or false, but it makes
the questions mathematically clear.
Bruno
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