On Sunday, May 11, 2014 11:10:58 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 11 May 2014, at 10:51, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > On Sunday, May 11, 2014 8:46:41 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark >>>>> discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, >>>>> if >>>>> any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a >>>>> "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then >>>>> consciousness >>>>> will be computable by definition. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even >>>> if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >>>> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >>>> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>>> >>>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >>> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >>> obvious? >>> >> >> Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so >> trivial to disprove: >> >> "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer >> could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not >> just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." >> >> 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) >> 2. brain generates consciousness but >> 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then >> 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) >> >> so comp = ~comp >> >> I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. >> >> >> I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not >> afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology for >> participating to the discussion with a shift. >> >> What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with comp >> (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes consciousness to >> a computer implemented in a primitive physical reality. Physics might be >> computable, in the sense that we can predict the physical behavior, but IF >> primitive matter is necessary for consciousness, then, although a virtual >> emulation would do (with different matter), an abstract or arithmetical >> computation would not do, by the lack of the primitive matter. >> I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is the >> role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, which seems >> here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or Maudlin's >> argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use here becomes >> magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious if there is >> primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can always reify >> some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to reality. >> > > I think it's much more likely to be related to proximity. Consciousness is > happening somewhere. > > > > That is ambiguous. What do you mean by somewhere? > There's nothing ambiguous. I am conscious...I make an observation about my own consciousness. I observe it is integrated, convergent, and - assuming it takes place in my brain - I conjecture it has the properties of convergence. I know that a major claim to science, that you believe you have, is that you use precise tools like modal logic. But this is wrong, when the initial knowledge is absent, Modal logic cannot create knowledge..it has to be there at the initialization. All you do, Bruno, by using greater precision than you really have, is obscure the level of true knowledge. That isn't good. It might look good, but it's actually much worse and much further from real science, than using appropriately vague language if ...IF...that is a truer reflection of the actual knowledge present. I think I have anwered your other questions below more or less here.
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