On Sunday, May 11, 2014 8:46:41 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 May 2014, at 12:12, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected] <javascript:>>wrote: > >> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]<javascript:> >> > wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark >>>> discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if >>>> any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a >>>> "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then consciousness >>>> will be computable by definition. >>>> >>> >>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even if >>> brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be >>> conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a >>> simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>> >>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >> obvious? >> > > Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so > trivial to disprove: > > "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer > could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not > just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." > > 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) > 2. brain generates consciousness but > 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then > 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) > > so comp = ~comp > > I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. > > > I guess other might have answer this, but as it is important I am not > afraid of repetition. O lost again the connection yesterday so apology for > participating to the discussion with a shift. > > What you miss is, I think, Peter Jones (1Z) argument. He is OK with comp > (say "yes" to the doctor), but only because he attributes consciousness to > a computer implemented in a primitive physical reality. Physics might be > computable, in the sense that we can predict the physical behavior, but IF > primitive matter is necessary for consciousness, then, although a virtual > emulation would do (with different matter), an abstract or arithmetical > computation would not do, by the lack of the primitive matter. > I agree that such an argument is weak, as it does not explain what is the > role of primitive matter, except as a criteria of existence, which seems > here to have a magical role. (Then the movie-graph argument, or Maudlin's > argument, give an idea that how much a primitive matter use here becomes > magical: almost like saying that a computation is conscious if there is > primitive matter and if God is willing to make it so. We can always reify > some "mystery" to block an application of a theory to reality. > I think it's much more likely to be related to proximity. Consciousness is happening somewhere. There's an integrated experience. There's basically a choice between divergent, non-local, or convergent effects. I think convergent the only candidate with a realistic answer to the reality of consciousness, which is convergent, and happening somewhere. So the convergence could well be one of the objectively true computational rules. Reality would make a 3D world, if that was a powerful format for computation. I don't really see why people are so attached to a vision of objective computation as exactly what our first version of computation happened to be. I mean, that isn't a very reasonable assumption. There's none of the sort of evidence we might have expected were it true this miracle of getting it right first time. We've made no progress at all in the last 50 years. Not on the big computational questions. Revolutions in technology have provided cover for this, allowing people to keep on talking about dramatic progress and keep on making this totally unrealistic assumptions about the final form of computationalism. But those revolutions have not derived from even a single step forward on the big questions. I And what's worse, science has not been able to move the big questions forward IN SPITE of the massive new possibilities with the technological revolution. I think it's pretty clear, something isn't right, and guess what...the elephant in the room is this notion that objective computation is exactly what we think it is. But no one will even look at it. I suppose it's a case of, from the inside of whatever world you are all in, it all feels like everything is go go go...progress.
> > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > Telmo. > > >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
