Hibbs,
I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to
me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet
MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable.

 And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I
think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string
theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a
single world.

However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination.
Richard


On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, <[email protected]> wrote:

>
> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>>   On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>  On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating
>>>>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".
>>>>>
>>>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
>>>>> nature.
>>>>>
>>>>>  When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some
>>>>> don't.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question
>>>> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about
>>>> what it means for something to exist.
>>>>
>>>>  So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not
>>>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else?
>>>>
>>>
>>>  I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter what
>>> comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?)
>>>
>>>  But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't,
>>> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or
>>> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives
>>> from that assumption, or there isn't.
>>>
>>>
>>> But the question is about how to test comp.  Bruno has offered that we
>>> should compare its predictions to observed physics.  My view is that this
>>> requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things
>>> happen and some don't.  "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in
>>> the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise
>>> and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and
>>> the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the
>>> cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1
>>> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing,
>>> or destructive interference in the observations.
>>>
>>> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum
>>> theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it
>>> needs to if comp is true.
>>>
>>> My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano
>>> Arithmetic, that concerns you.
>>>
>>> It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in
>>> arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics.
>>>
>>> I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
>>> propositional tautologies.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>  So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of
>> testability.
>>
>> So may I do a little test here.  Can anyone here, other than Bruno,
>> explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to
>> that?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics
>> match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we   will
>> learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but   if there
>> is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well,   comp + the
>> classical theory of knowledge)." *
>>
>> How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of
>> knowledge" change the commitment to falsification?
>>
>>
>> Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of
>> *studying* the papers.  Note that in some presentation, I take the
>> classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other
>> presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and it
>> is the object of the thesis.
>>
>> More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in focus,
>> not the success of my pedagogy on this list.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific standards,
> conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and explanations you lay out
> in your theory, may certainly arrive at various conclusions for the
> implications comp has for the world. And I'm quite sure within that you
> offer your explanation for the falsifiability of comp.
>
> But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you think the
> details of your argument is an influential factor in settling the matter of
> falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is
> irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf.
>
> In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In at
> least one of your papers you offer this...little package of
> philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds
> later concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the
> time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and probably
> religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory is falsifiable
> because its fundamental position requires huge accomplishments, like
> deriving physics.
>
> So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE, by
> definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily, apparently
> denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would be very easy to
> guide you to where you said it...repeatedly...and to my protests. Just as
> it would have been easy to demonstrate multiple occasions on which you
> claimed computations are intrinsically conscious, and the other events too.
> The reason I haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any
> clarification or edit as the right version if you say it is.
>
> I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated now
> Bruno, is that you're confused what the meaning of falsifiability actually
> is. Your angry rebuff concluded in making me responsible for 'not getting
> it'....before yet another 'clarification' that your theory simply leaves
> 'no choice'...and it's this property of contraining to block all paths but
> the one, that delivers the scientific standard.
>
> But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the reason your
> theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the local physicals, and
> compare that with taking a summation of an infinite multiverse of possible
> computations. Apparently, if there is a 'difference' comp is falsified.
> Well...not quite....comp + classical natural law is falsified.
>
> There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the other
> more careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to exhibit the
> properties of testability. But what's really telling is that you describe a
> sort of, process....a sequence of steps.....apparently with a falsification
> as one possible outcome.
>
> So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the
> arguments of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has not
> even begun to approach actually resolving...or even the basic thinking of
> what such a resolution would look like. A summation of an infinity of
> multiverses of all possible computations? And who or what decides when the
> infinite set is all accounted for? Could it be we'll have to rely on the
> arguments within your theory for that? Could it also be your theory
> currently has no better insight of what it even means than I do...not that
> can be independently verified or tested.
>
> So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the summation
> of infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct formulation of
> the 'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So your theory will  -
> oneday - perform this calculation.....and so your theory will assess the
> results....and then your theory will announce whether it is falsified or
> not.
>
> You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you know why
> it's like this? It's because you are trying to define falsifiability within
> your theory and tell the world a new definition based on a process of
> far-future sequenced events.
>
> Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in this
> little goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they enjoy your
> theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your patience and willingness
> to engage any person. Listen....I like many of your qualities too. My
> intuition with the fullness of time, is that you've seriously wasted my
> time by engaging with me about the items important to me.....it's very
> clear at no time have you been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of
> falsification, and confront the very obvious serious questions.
>
> So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one else
> here in this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for any claims you
> make.....and largely don't really care that much about the old fashioned
> falsifiability thing......all rather passé in the infinite infinities of
> infinities of everything infinitely explained. Sorry...below the belt...no
> grievance and so on. So anyway, they let you get away with murder Bruno,
> and you fool yourself this is reflects the norm. My questions and concerns
> are the norm mate.
>
> I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking about,
> and you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get away with it
> because no one holds you to account for things like this. But the lone
> position from me....and as it happens the vast majority of serious
> scientists I should think, is that you don't begin to understand the nature
> and distinctiveness of falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher:
>
> 1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us
> something NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and above
> offering some new *explanation* of exactly what we already know. This is
> the fundamental substance of testability, and falsifiability.
>
> This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single non-trivial
> prediction from all your work. It does not count to say, you predict your
> theory will do great things...it does not count to then argue that if it
> doesn't do those great things that would be a falsification. It does not
> add any value at all to exchange a prediction for a process of far future
> steps. The theorist has no say how his prediction is tested...he's as
> welcome as the next person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the whole
> end to end process of testing/observing, is complete outside the theory and
> the whimsical arguments of the theorist. And this separation is
> fundamental. This is what it's all about.
>
> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the
> scientific sense.  No one calls you on this.....here.....but then
> again.....let's face it no one answered my question either. But other
> there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and
> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add
> value for you....for my part I would actually question the way your friends
> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude.
>
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