On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Hibbs, > I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to > me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. > > > > The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) > entails the MWI. OK. > Not OK and not true. > > But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the > classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), > the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In > fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, > earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). > > Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. > > > I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough > test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as > real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the > sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers, > and in Einstein reality definition. > The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. > > (*) MC = Many Computations. > > > > And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I > think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string > theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a > single world. > > > I doubt this. > > > > > However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, > > > Thanks. > > > a rare combination. > > > I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you > are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. > > Bruno > > > > > Richard > > > On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: >>>> >>>> On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating >>>>>> one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". >>>>>> >>>>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with >>>>>> nature. >>>>>> >>>>>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some >>>>>> don't. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question >>>>> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about >>>>> what it means for something to exist. >>>>> >>>>> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not >>>>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter >>>> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, >>>> pun?) >>>> >>>> But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, >>>> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or >>>> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives >>>> from that assumption, or there isn't. >>>> >>>> >>>> But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we >>>> should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this >>>> requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things >>>> happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in >>>> the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white >>>> noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, >>>> and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of >>>> the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 >>>> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, >>>> or destructive interference in the observations. >>>> >>>> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the >>>> quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, >>>> as it needs to if comp is true. >>>> >>>> My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano >>>> Arithmetic, that concerns you. >>>> >>>> It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in >>>> arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. >>>> >>>> I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum >>>> propositional tautologies. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>> >>> So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of >>> testability. >>> >>> So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, >>> explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to >>> that? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics >>> match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will >>> learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there >>> is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the >>> classical theory of knowledge)." * >>> >>> How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of >>> knowledge" change the commitment to falsification? >>> >>> >>> Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of >>> *studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take the >>> classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other >>> presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and it >>> is the object of the thesis. >>> >>> More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in focus, >>> not the success of my pedagogy on this list. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific standards, >> conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and explanations you lay out >> in your theory, may certainly arrive at various conclusions for the >> implications comp has for the world. And I'm quite sure within that you >> offer your explanation for the falsifiability of comp. >> >> But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you think the >> details of your argument is an influential factor in settling the matter of >> falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is >> irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf. >> >> In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In at >> least one of your papers you offer this...little package of >> philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds >> later concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the >> time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and probably >> religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory is falsifiable >> because its fundamental position requires huge accomplishments, like >> deriving physics. >> >> So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE, by >> definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily, apparently >> denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would be very easy to >> guide you to where you said it...repeatedly...and to my protests. Just as >> it would have been easy to demonstrate multiple occasions on which you >> claimed computations are intrinsically conscious, and the other events too. >> The reason I haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any >> clarification or edit as the right version if you say it is. >> >> I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated now >> Bruno, is that you're confused what the meaning of falsifiability actually >> is. Your angry rebuff concluded in making me responsible for 'not getting >> it'....before yet another 'clarification' that your theory simply leaves >> 'no choice'...and it's this property of contraining to block all paths but >> the one, that delivers the scientific standard. >> >> But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the reason >> your theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the local physicals, >> and compare that with taking a summation of an infinite multiverse of >> possible computations. Apparently, if there is a 'difference' comp is >> falsified. Well...not quite....comp + classical natural law is falsified. >> >> There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the other >> more careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to exhibit the >> properties of testability. But what's really telling is that you describe a >> sort of, process....a sequence of steps.....apparently with a falsification >> as one possible outcome. >> >> So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the >> arguments of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has not >> even begun to approach actually resolving...or even the basic thinking of >> what such a resolution would look like. A summation of an infinity of >> multiverses of all possible computations? And who or what decides when the >> infinite set is all accounted for? Could it be we'll have to rely on the >> arguments within your theory for that? Could it also be your theory >> currently has no better insight of what it even means than I do...not that >> can be independently verified or tested. >> >> So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the >> summation of infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct >> formulation of the 'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So your >> theory will - oneday - perform this calculation.....and so your theory >> will assess the results....and then your theory will announce whether it is >> falsified or not. >> >> You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you know >> why it's like this? It's because you are trying to define falsifiability >> within your theory and tell the world a new definition based on a process >> of far-future sequenced events. >> >> Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in this >> little goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they enjoy your >> theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your patience and willingness >> to engage any person. Listen....I like many of your qualities too. My >> intuition with the fullness of time, is that you've seriously wasted my >> time by engaging with me about the items important to me.....it's very >> clear at no time have you been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of >> falsification, and confront the very obvious serious questions. >> >> So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one else >> here in this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for any claims you >> make.....and largely don't really care that much about the old fashioned >> falsifiability thing......all rather passé in the infinite infinities of >> infinities of everything infinitely explained. Sorry...below the belt...no >> grievance and so on. So anyway, they let you get away with murder Bruno, >> and you fool yourself this is reflects the norm. My questions and concerns >> are the norm mate. >> >> I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking >> about, and you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get away >> with it because no one holds you to account for things like this. But the >> lone position from me....and as it happens the vast majority of serious >> scientists I should think, is that you don't begin to understand the nature >> and distinctiveness of falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher: >> >> 1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us >> something NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and above >> offering some new *explanation* of exactly what we already know. This is >> the fundamental substance of testability, and falsifiability. >> >> This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single non-trivial >> prediction from all your work. It does not count to say, you predict your >> theory will do great things...it does not count to then argue that if it >> doesn't do those great things that would be a falsification. It does not >> add any value at all to exchange a prediction for a process of far future >> steps. The theorist has no say how his prediction is tested...he's as >> welcome as the next person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the whole >> end to end process of testing/observing, is complete outside the theory and >> the whimsical arguments of the theorist. And this separation is >> fundamental. This is what it's all about. >> >> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the >> scientific sense. No one calls you on this.....here.....but then >> again.....let's face it no one answered my question either. But other >> there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and >> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add >> value for you....for my part I would actually question the way your friends >> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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