On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote:
> It is easy to prove that "99.9% of scientists believe in MWI" is not true. > The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such > a belief. > Gotta go. > Where do you see Bruno make such a statement? > > > On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>> >>>> Hibbs, >>>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems >>>> to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. >>>> >>>> >>>> He said: > >>>> The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) >>>> entails the MWI. OK. >>>> >>> Comp entails MWI does not mean majority of scientists believe MWI. So straw man, Richard. PGC > >>> Not OK and not true. >>> >> >> So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or >> mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, >> given its step 0 assumptions)? >> >> What do they believe in then, according to you? >> >> Prove it, Richard. Yelling "Not ok", is not sufficient. Same for the >> flaws you claim to have found. PGC >> >> >>> >>>> But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of >>>> the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical >>>> philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, >>>> or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in >>>> heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). >>>> >>>> Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. >>>> >>>> >>>> I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough >>>> test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as >>>> real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the >>>> sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers, >>>> and in Einstein reality definition. >>>> >>> >>> The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all >>> select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. >>> >>>> >>>> (*) MC = Many Computations. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. >>>> I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string >>>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a >>>> single world. >>>> >>>> >>>> I doubt this. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks. >>>> >>>> >>>> a rare combination. >>>> >>>> >>>> I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more >>>> you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Richard >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of >>>>>>>>> emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, >>>>>>>>> i.e. is >>>>>>>>> "real". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare >>>>>>>>> with nature. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and >>>>>>>>> some don't. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the >>>>>>>> question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the >>>>>>>> question >>>>>>>> about what it means for something to exist. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not >>>>>>>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter >>>>>>> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, >>>>>>> pun?) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it >>>>>>> isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some >>>>>>> level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> derives from that assumption, or there isn't. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that >>>>>>> we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that >>>>>>> this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some >>>>>>> things happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens >>>>>>> somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white >>>>>>> noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on >>>>>>> this, >>>>>>> and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local >>>>>>> erasing of >>>>>>> the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 >>>>>>> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum >>>>>>> erazing, >>>>>>> or destructive interference in the observations. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the >>>>>>> quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for >>>>>>> comp, >>>>>>> as it needs to if comp is true. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano >>>>>>> Arithmetic, that concerns you. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem >>>>>>> in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum >>>>>>> propositional tautologies. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story >>>>>> of testability. >>>>>> >>>>>> So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, >>>>>> explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to >>>>>> that? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> *"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics >>>>>> match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we >>>>>> will >>>>>> learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if >>>>>> there >>>>>> is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + >>>>>> the >>>>>> classical theory of knowledge)." * >>>>>> >>>>>> How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of >>>>>> knowledge" change the commitment to falsification? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter >>>>>> of *studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take the >>>>>> classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other >>>>>> presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and it >>>>>> is the object of the thesis. >>>>>> >>>>>> More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in >>>>>> focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think you're confused where your theory >>>>> ends and scientific standards, conventions, definitions begin. The >>>>> arguments and explanations you lay out in your theory, may certainly >>>>> arrive at various conclusions for the implications comp has for the >>>>> world. And I'm quite sure within that you offer your explanation for the >>>>> falsifiability of comp. >>>>> >>>>> But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you >>>>> think the details of your argument is an influential factor in settling >>>>> the >>>>> matter of falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is >>>>> irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf. >>>>> >>>>> In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In >>>>> at least one of your papers you offer this...little package of >>>>> philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds >>>>> later concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the >>>>> time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and probably >>>>> religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory is falsifiable >>>>> because its fundamental position requires huge accomplishments, like >>>>> deriving physics. >>>>> >>>>> So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE, by >>>>> definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily, apparently >>>>> denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would be very easy to >>>>> guide you to where you said it...repeatedly...and to my protests. Just as >>>>> it would have been easy to demonstrate multiple occasions on which you >>>>> claimed computations are intrinsically conscious, and the other events >>>>> too. >>>>> The reason I haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any >>>>> clarification or edit as the right version if you say it is. >>>>> >>>>> I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated >>>>> now Bruno, is that you're confused what the meaning of falsifiability >>>>> actually is. Your angry rebuff concluded in making me responsible for 'not >>>>> getting it'....before yet another 'clarification' that your theory simply >>>>> leaves 'no choice'...and it's this property of contraining to block all >>>>> paths but the one, that delivers the scientific standard. >>>>> >>>>> But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the reason >>>>> your theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the local physicals, >>>>> and compare that with taking a summation of an infinite multiverse of >>>>> possible computations. Apparently, if there is a 'difference' comp is >>>>> falsified. Well...not quite....comp + classical natural law is falsified. >>>>> >>>>> There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the other >>>>> more careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to exhibit the >>>>> properties of testability. But what's really telling is that you describe >>>>> a >>>>> sort of, process....a sequence of steps.....apparently with a >>>>> falsification >>>>> as one possible outcome. >>>>> >>>>> So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the >>>>> arguments of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has not >>>>> even begun to approach actually resolving...or even the basic thinking of >>>>> what such a resolution would look like. A summation of an infinity of >>>>> multiverses of all possible computations? And who or what decides when the >>>>> infinite set is all accounted for? Could it be we'll have to rely on the >>>>> arguments within your theory for that? Could it also be your theory >>>>> currently has no better insight of what it even means than I do...not that >>>>> can be independently verified or tested. >>>>> >>>>> So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the >>>>> summation of infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct >>>>> formulation of the 'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So your >>>>> theory will - oneday - perform this calculation.....and so your theory >>>>> will assess the results....and then your theory will announce whether it >>>>> is >>>>> falsified or not. >>>>> >>>>> You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you know >>>>> why it's like this? It's because you are trying to define falsifiability >>>>> within your theory and tell the world a new definition based on a process >>>>> of far-future sequenced events. >>>>> >>>>> Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in this >>>>> little goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they enjoy your >>>>> theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your patience and >>>>> willingness >>>>> to engage any person. Listen....I like many of your qualities too. My >>>>> intuition with the fullness of time, is that you've seriously wasted my >>>>> time by engaging with me about the items important to me.....it's very >>>>> clear at no time have you been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of >>>>> falsification, and confront the very obvious serious questions. >>>>> >>>>> So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one >>>>> else here in this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for any >>>>> claims >>>>> you make.....and largely don't really care that much about the old >>>>> fashioned falsifiability thing......all rather passé in the infinite >>>>> infinities of infinities of everything infinitely explained. Sorry...below >>>>> the belt...no grievance and so on. So anyway, they let you get away with >>>>> murder Bruno, and you fool yourself this is reflects the norm. My >>>>> questions >>>>> and concerns are the norm mate. >>>>> >>>>> I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking >>>>> about, and you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get away >>>>> with it because no one holds you to account for things like this. But the >>>>> lone position from me....and as it happens the vast majority of serious >>>>> scientists I should think, is that you don't begin to understand the >>>>> nature >>>>> and distinctiveness of falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher: >>>>> >>>>> 1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us >>>>> something NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and above >>>>> offering some new *explanation* of exactly what we already know. This is >>>>> the fundamental substance of testability, and falsifiability. >>>>> >>>>> This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single >>>>> non-trivial prediction from all your work. It does not count to say, you >>>>> predict your theory will do great things...it does not count to then argue >>>>> that if it doesn't do those great things that would be a falsification. It >>>>> does not add any value at all to exchange a prediction for a process of >>>>> far >>>>> future steps. The theorist has no say how his prediction is tested...he's >>>>> as welcome as the next person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the >>>>> whole end to end process of testing/observing, is complete outside the >>>>> theory and the whimsical arguments of the theorist. And this separation is >>>>> fundamental. This is what it's all about. >>>>> >>>>> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the >>>>> scientific sense. No one calls you on this.....here.....but then >>>>> again.....let's face it no one answered my question either. But other >>>>> there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and >>>>> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add >>>>> value for you....for my part I would actually question the way your >>>>> friends >>>>> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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