It is easy to prove that "99.9% of scientists believe in MWI" is not true. The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such a belief. Gotta go.
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy < [email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Hibbs, >>> I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems >>> to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. >>> >>> >>> >>> The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) >>> entails the MWI. OK. >>> >> >> Not OK and not true. >> > > So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or > mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, > given its step 0 assumptions)? > > What do they believe in then, according to you? > > Prove it, Richard. Yelling "Not ok", is not sufficient. Same for the flaws > you claim to have found. PGC > > >> >>> But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the >>> classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), >>> the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In >>> fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, >>> earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). >>> >>> Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. >>> >>> >>> I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough >>> test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use "world" is the sense of a reality as >>> real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the >>> sense of some ontology, as you know "I believe" only in natural numbers, >>> and in Einstein reality definition. >>> >> >> The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all >> select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. >> >>> >>> (*) MC = Many Computations. >>> >>> >>> >>> And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. >>> I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string >>> theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a >>> single world. >>> >>> >>> I doubt this. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, >>> >>> >>> Thanks. >>> >>> >>> a rare combination. >>> >>> >>> I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more >>> you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Richard >>> >>> >>> On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, [email protected] wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of >>>>>>>> emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> "real". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with >>>>>>>> nature. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and >>>>>>>> some don't. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the >>>>>>> question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the >>>>>>> question >>>>>>> about what it means for something to exist. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not >>>>>>> falsified because it may be true somewhere else? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter >>>>>> what comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, >>>>>> pun?) >>>>>> >>>>>> But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, >>>>>> which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, >>>>>> or >>>>>> it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives >>>>>> from that assumption, or there isn't. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that >>>>>> we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that >>>>>> this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some >>>>>> things happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens >>>>>> somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white >>>>>> noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on >>>>>> this, >>>>>> and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing >>>>>> of >>>>>> the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 >>>>>> proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, >>>>>> or destructive interference in the observations. >>>>>> >>>>>> To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the >>>>>> quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for >>>>>> comp, >>>>>> as it needs to if comp is true. >>>>>> >>>>>> My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano >>>>>> Arithmetic, that concerns you. >>>>>> >>>>>> It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in >>>>>> arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. >>>>>> >>>>>> I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum >>>>>> propositional tautologies. >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story >>>>> of testability. >>>>> >>>>> So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, >>>>> explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to >>>>> that? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *"By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics >>>>> match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will >>>>> learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if >>>>> there >>>>> is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the >>>>> classical theory of knowledge)." * >>>>> >>>>> How does the end part "well, comp + the classical theory of >>>>> knowledge" change the commitment to falsification? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of >>>>> *studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take the >>>>> classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other >>>>> presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and it >>>>> is the object of the thesis. >>>>> >>>>> More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in >>>>> focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>> >>>> I think you're confused where your theory >>>> ends and scientific standards, conventions, definitions begin. The >>>> arguments and explanations you lay out in your theory, may certainly >>>> arrive at various conclusions for the implications comp has for the >>>> world. And I'm quite sure within that you offer your explanation for the >>>> falsifiability of comp. >>>> >>>> But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you >>>> think the details of your argument is an influential factor in settling the >>>> matter of falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is >>>> irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf. >>>> >>>> In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In >>>> at least one of your papers you offer this...little package of >>>> philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds >>>> later concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the >>>> time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and probably >>>> religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory is falsifiable >>>> because its fundamental position requires huge accomplishments, like >>>> deriving physics. >>>> >>>> So I mentioned the same argument is applicable to any and all ToE, by >>>> definition. Which is obviously true...but you reacted angrily, apparently >>>> denying you ever constructed such an argument. It would be very easy to >>>> guide you to where you said it...repeatedly...and to my protests. Just as >>>> it would have been easy to demonstrate multiple occasions on which you >>>> claimed computations are intrinsically conscious, and the other events too. >>>> The reason I haven't is intellectual respect and a wish to accept any >>>> clarification or edit as the right version if you say it is. >>>> >>>> I've gone out of my way to do this...but the plain data accumulated now >>>> Bruno, is that you're confused what the meaning of falsifiability actually >>>> is. Your angry rebuff concluded in making me responsible for 'not getting >>>> it'....before yet another 'clarification' that your theory simply leaves >>>> 'no choice'...and it's this property of contraining to block all paths but >>>> the one, that delivers the scientific standard. >>>> >>>> But you've moved past that in the few posts since, and now the reason >>>> your theory is falsifiable is because we can look to the local physicals, >>>> and compare that with taking a summation of an infinite multiverse of >>>> possible computations. Apparently, if there is a 'difference' comp is >>>> falsified. Well...not quite....comp + classical natural law is falsified. >>>> >>>> There is nothing - no part - of this formulation...or any of the other >>>> more careful attempts that I have seen, that even begins to exhibit the >>>> properties of testability. But what's really telling is that you describe a >>>> sort of, process....a sequence of steps.....apparently with a falsification >>>> as one possible outcome. >>>> >>>> So...you define falsifiability as a process....a process within the >>>> arguments of your theory. Each step of the process, your theory has not >>>> even begun to approach actually resolving...or even the basic thinking of >>>> what such a resolution would look like. A summation of an infinity of >>>> multiverses of all possible computations? And who or what decides when the >>>> infinite set is all accounted for? Could it be we'll have to rely on the >>>> arguments within your theory for that? Could it also be your theory >>>> currently has no better insight of what it even means than I do...not that >>>> can be independently verified or tested. >>>> >>>> So let's recap Bruno...your theory will one day tell us what the >>>> summation of infinities comes to....and presumably also the correct >>>> formulation of the 'local neighbourhood' for a 1:1 comparison. So your >>>> theory will - oneday - perform this calculation.....and so your theory >>>> will assess the results....and then your theory will announce whether it is >>>> falsified or not. >>>> >>>> You can surely see that this is a self-referring mess. And do you know >>>> why it's like this? It's because you are trying to define falsifiability >>>> within your theory and tell the world a new definition based on a process >>>> of far-future sequenced events. >>>> >>>> Oh sure, I'm the only one that seems to care about this here in this >>>> little goldfish bowl. People here....they like you....they enjoy your >>>> theory.......appreciate what they perceive as your patience and willingness >>>> to engage any person. Listen....I like many of your qualities too. My >>>> intuition with the fullness of time, is that you've seriously wasted my >>>> time by engaging with me about the items important to me.....it's very >>>> clear at no time have you been willing to re-evaluate your envisionings of >>>> falsification, and confront the very obvious serious questions. >>>> >>>> So you've wasted my time.......and fooled yourself the fact no one else >>>> here in this tiny group feels any need to haul you over for any claims you >>>> make.....and largely don't really care that much about the old fashioned >>>> falsifiability thing......all rather passé in the infinite infinities of >>>> infinities of everything infinitely explained. Sorry...below the belt...no >>>> grievance and so on. So anyway, they let you get away with murder Bruno, >>>> and you fool yourself this is reflects the norm. My questions and concerns >>>> are the norm mate. >>>> >>>> I know you'll be coming back saying you don't know what I'm talking >>>> about, and you'll restate your theory is testable...and you'll get away >>>> with it because no one holds you to account for things like this. But the >>>> lone position from me....and as it happens the vast majority of serious >>>> scientists I should think, is that you don't begin to understand the nature >>>> and distinctiveness of falsifiability, so I'll leave you with a refresher: >>>> >>>> 1) A precise, non-trivial prediction is fundamental, that tells us >>>> something NEW about physical law....that is to say, goes over and above >>>> offering some new *explanation* of exactly what we already know. This is >>>> the fundamental substance of testability, and falsifiability. >>>> >>>> This Bruno, you never accomplish. You never produce a single >>>> non-trivial prediction from all your work. It does not count to say, you >>>> predict your theory will do great things...it does not count to then argue >>>> that if it doesn't do those great things that would be a falsification. It >>>> does not add any value at all to exchange a prediction for a process of far >>>> future steps. The theorist has no say how his prediction is tested...he's >>>> as welcome as the next person to make a helpful suggestion.....but the >>>> whole end to end process of testing/observing, is complete outside the >>>> theory and the whimsical arguments of the theorist. And this separation is >>>> fundamental. This is what it's all about. >>>> >>>> So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the >>>> scientific sense. No one calls you on this.....here.....but then >>>> again.....let's face it no one answered my question either. But other >>>> there....all you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and >>>> written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add >>>> value for you....for my part I would actually question the way your friends >>>> write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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