On 16 May 2014, at 09:48, Dennis Ochei wrote:
I'd be very grateful if you could elaborate. What precisely is comp?
That the universe is computable?
It is more that my brain is computable, or that my "generalized brain"
is computable, where the generalized brain is anything that if it is
turing emulated at some relevant level, I will survive in the usual
clinical sense.
It is not the assumption that the universe (physical, or mathematical)
is computable, and actually, computationalism (comp) makes the
appearance of the universe not entirely computable. It makes also
(well, I argue) the physical universe into a sort of border of the
reality of mind, which is itself defined by computer science or
arithmetic, so that leads to testable consequences in physics, notably
a sort of "many reality" structure, and somehow, quantum mechanics
confirms this (if you have read Everett).
I take physicalism pretty seriously, but of course it could be wrong
or incomplete, but i think it places a limit on what is knowable.
Eventually it is the theory of machine beliefs, knowledge and
observation which will put some limit of what a physical reality can be.
I don't expect this to be obvious. It is slightly less difficult for
people open to the "many-worlds" view of QM (Everett), and/or for
those who reminds dreams and have experienced different sort of
consciousness state. Such experiences are not necessary, but can open
the mind of people stuck in the aristotelian conception of reality,
that is with a primitive ontological physical reality.
Reading paper now, im clear on comp
OK. Nice.
What are these boxes [] supposed to mean? And <> ?
In what I propose, most of the time, "[]p" is for Gödel
"beweisbar" (provable) predicate written in the language of
arithmetic, and handled by a "sufficiently rich" (called here
"Löbian") machine, like PA (Peano Arithmetic).
<>p can be seen as an abbreviation of ~[] ~p, and is read "consistent
p" (as indeed if PA cannot prove ~p, p is consistant with PA.
Solovay discovered that the modal logic G axiomatized the behavoir of
Gödel's beweisbar.
G is a so called normal modal logic. It means classical propositional
logic + one symbol "[]", and the axioms [](A -> B) -> ([]A -> []B)
and []([]A -> A) -> []A, and with the modus ponens rule of inference
(from A and A-> B you can deduce B), and necessitation, from A you can
deduce B. He found also the important (non normal) modal logic G*,
which axiomatizes the true logic of provability, as opposed to the
part that the machine can prove.
Just to explain G and G*, I talk on many different modal logic, and in
that case the box and diamond have a more general meaning. I also
study different type of modal logics derived from G and G*.
The classical theory of knowledge, which I mention often is the modal
logic T, or S4, with the axioms []A -> A, and sometimes also []A -> []
[]A (introspection, self-awareness).
> This is so true that if you push the reasoning you will understand
that the primitive character of physics is an illusion, even if a
particular important one that no machines can avoid (statistically).
I want to grok this statement can you give me more? Why is physics
an illusion
Well, that's a long story. Normally the paper explain. The idea is
that a tiny part of the arithmetical reality emulate all computation,
and that a machine has no means to distinguish, *quickly* a
computation done in arithmetic from a computation done by any other
universal system, so that to really predicts any experience you do (or
any future first person account you can do for an experience), you
need to look at all the computation going through your state, and
evaluate the proportion going in some other states. But then physics
is reduced to a statistics on computations in arithmetic. At first
sight there will be too many computations (the white rabbit problem)
but using an idea of Theaetetus, and variants, we can recover enough
constraints to recover a quantum like reality, and perhaps some
destructive interference on the "white rabbits".
> Are you OK that the probability to find yourself in Moscow is 1/2,
when you are read and cut in Helsinki, and build again in Moscow and
Washington?
I'm down with that
OK. I might come back on this, as I have to go soon. You will have to
keep in mind the difference between the first person discourse of the
experiencer(s), which are simply the sequence of result of experiments
written in the diary, with the third person description, which is
deterministic, with a person which is multiplied. The key is that the
"first person experiment diary" is taken with the experiencers, and so
is also multiplied, unlike a third person diary.
If your reiterated the WM duplication, each diary will contain a
sequence like
WWWMWMMMWWMMMMMWMWMMW
And combinatorial calculus can show that most are algorithmically
incompressible. So if you bet money, you have more chance to win if
you predict a random sequence than the binary digits of PI (say). OK?
Of course, with a naive use of the "open mind" theory, you might say
that you are in both W and M, (as you are everyone!), but the guy in M
will still to have to write M in his diary, and the guy in W will
write W, and both have to distinguish their immediate feeling (oh I am
definitely in this city), with the intellectual knowledge that their
body is in both city (the third person view). OK?
> It is an easy exercise to show that the iteration of such
duplication leads to non compressible white noise for most of the
2^n persons obtained when the duplication experiment is repeated n
times.
Don't get this either, but I haven't finished the paper, so maybe
that will illuminate things
OK. Please let us know if you have a problem with that.
Bruno
On Friday, May 16, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 16 May 2014, at 02:13, LizR wrote:
On 16 May 2014 10:36, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote:
Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify
the presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own
I? Or do all moments everywhere share a single global I? If there
are local I's, then how are their boundaries drawn?
Yes, those are indeed the questions. Especially the last one. I
don't think we're in a position to answer them (or if we ever will
be...)
All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of
physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide. All my
observations and brain processes will be identical no matter which
hypothesis is true.
Only from physics which isn't derivable from psychology via comp, I
suspect, so Bruno may have something to say about this.
Not sure Dennis use seriously physicalism though, but in principle
you are right, and I already said something.
Dennis Ochei seems to believe in primary physics (like all
aristotelians), and comp, but they does not work well together, and
leads to person and consciousness elimination (which I take as total
nonsense).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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