Reading paper now, im clear on comp On Friday, May 16, 2014, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote:
> I'd be very grateful if you could elaborate. What precisely is comp? That > the universe is computable? I take physicalism pretty seriously, but of > course it could be wrong or incomplete, but i think it places a limit on > what is knowable. > > On Friday, May 16, 2014, Bruno Marchal > <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> > wrote: > >> >> On 16 May 2014, at 02:13, LizR wrote: >> >> On 16 May 2014 10:36, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify the >>> presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own I? Or do all >>> moments everywhere share a single global I? If there are local I's, then >>> how are their boundaries drawn? >> >> >> Yes, those are indeed the questions. Especially the last one. I don't >> think we're in a position to answer them (or if we ever will be...) >> >>> >>> All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of >>> physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide. All my observations and >>> brain processes will be identical no matter which hypothesis is true. >>> >>> Only from physics which isn't derivable from psychology via comp, I >> suspect, so Bruno may have something to say about this. >> >> >> Not sure Dennis use seriously physicalism though, but in principle you >> are right, and I already said something. >> >> Dennis Ochei seems to believe in primary physics (like all >> aristotelians), and comp, but they does not work well together, and leads >> to person and consciousness elimination (which I take as total nonsense). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > Sent from Gmail Mobile > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
