On 23 June 2014 05:49, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno >>> says. >>> >> >> > I agree, >> > > Good. > > > but >> > > But? There is no "but", Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game over. >
It isn't a prediction, as far as I can see, it's a description of how people think about probability. I don't see how anything hinges on what someone would intuitively predict about their future. > > > I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the >> quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, >> > > Since they both involve probabilities the 2 experiments must be repeated > many times to test the underlying theoretical predictions, the 2 slit > experiment to test the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment to test his > Universal Dance Association theory. > Yes. > When you repeat the 2 slit experiment you find that sometimes the electron > went through slit X and sometimes it did not, but no > With the electron you find that it always appears to go through both slits, otherwise no interference fringes. > matter how often you repeat Bruno's thought experiment you ALWAYS find > that Mr. You (or Mrs. You) sees Moscow. The results of these experiments > tell us that the MWI might be true but Bruno's Universal Dance Association > theory is definitely wrong because it made the wrong prediction. > It isn't an experiment, it's merely showing the same thing Everett did (as far as I can see). > > >> > I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the >> next second >> > > And Mrs. I will indeed do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second. > > > including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki >> > > True, although Mrs I also never saw Helsinki and was instead spontaneously > being teleported to Moscow. This would be a very odd situation but it is > NOT a logical paradox because Mrs. I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. > Yes, I think we all agree on that. > > > but I act just as though I only have one future. >> > > Acting as if you have only one future is not the same as having only one > future, that's why the MWI isn't intuitively obvious to everybody. > I agree. And I think the same applies to comp. > > > The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter >> > > Until about 90 years ago physicists would say that all probability is just > a psychological matter, it's just a measure of our ignorance; then they > said probability is inherent to the thing itself, but if the MWI turns out > to be true then probability goes back to being subjective. > Yes, and comp parallels the MWI. OK. > > > Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect >> of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. >> > > No, Bruno has said over and over that he has found some new sort > of indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from Turing style > indeterminacy or > Heisenberg style indeterminacy, I say it's just the same old indeterminacy. > I agree, I think - comp indeterminacy is based on the same principle as Everettian indeterminacy (I'm not sure what Turing indeterminacy is, and I assume the Heisenberg type is "genuine physical" indeterminacy?) But I wasn't aware Bruno thought any differently. Are you sure this isn't just a semantic disagreement? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
