On 25 Jul 2014, at 17:07, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 22 Jul 2014, at 20:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, July 22, 2014 1:56:26 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
PGC,
I am not being critical of Bruno. I just do not understand what he
is saying.
My understanding is that if comp is correct, it is both 3p and 1p
correct.
Bruno's argument to me has been that comp is not correct in 1p.
When I ask him how he (being a machine) can understand comp to be
correct, he seems to vacillate between saying that machines can
learn to be more correct and saying that he himself doesn't
believe comp is correct in some sense.
Your sum up is misleading.
I use the theory comp. I am a scientist, and so I don't even try to
argue for its truth, especially that later we get the understanding
that this is vain. If true, it is not provable. It might be
refutable, and I give a test.
No machine, nor me, can understand comp to be correct. But we can
assume it, and deduce from there. Indeed, if we deduce f, we refute
comp.
Now, the amazing point, which I prove, is that if we accept the
definition of Theaetetus of knowledge, with believability modelize
by provability (which makes sense in the idea case needed for the
mind-body problem), we get as mathematical consequence that the 1p
cannot be defined in any 3p terms by the machine itself, and the
machine can know that, both from inside 1p experience, and from
reasoning in the comp assumption.
The simple answer, in my view, is that the hypothesis is false.
It's a great hypothesis, and if we did not experience red and
dizzy and sweet then it would make perfect sense, however those
experiences have no place in a universe of arithmetic truths.
Because you limit your view of arithmetical truth to only the 3p
objects, but the objects themselves don't do that, and we can share
some definition with them and agree on that point. The soul of any
machine, is not a machine.
Comp tells us about a world of the intellect if the intellect
created the world, but that is not the world that we actually live
in, and no computer program has ever, by itself, lifted a finger,
tasted a cookie, enjoyed a moment of peace, etc.
The intellect is the Noùs ([]p, in qG*), the soul is the []p & p,
and it has no 3p description. But some 3p meta-descriptions with
comp. That is why we, the numbers, have a theology. Right at the
start.
Bruno, Didn't I just read today a statement of yours that the soul
in 3p is its description.? Richard
Hi Richard,
I only said that the 3p self is its description. It is the body, as
seen as a "code" written in "nature's" language, or anything from
which you can build that body (like the "Gödel number" sent by a
teletransporter device). It is the "[]p", and can be seen as an
object in arithmetic (or even in physics, temporarily).
The soul, on the contrary is defined with the Theaetetus method,
[]p & p, and appears to be not describable in any 3p way. I will
come back on explaining why this is so. I have already alluded to
the explanation. From scratch it is long and pretty technical.
Bruno
Thank you Bruno for explaining the distinction between self and
soul. But it seems to me that if the soul can only be 1p, is there a
soul for every different 1p person in the 3p self. I would prefer
one soul, and even one person.
I am not sure what makes you think that this would not be the case. We
have one abstract body, even if implemented through infinitely many
computations, which can diverge. And we have one soul, which feels
unique, and *is* unique from the 1p perspective, even if, from a 3-1p
perspective, they multiplied, like with amoeba division and animals
reproduction. Roughly the 3p body/self is the []p, and the soul is
defined (or meta-defined) by []p & p.
Anyway, what we prefer might not always be the case. I don't like so
much that self-multiplication too, but it is unavoidable once we
assume the computationalist theory of mind.
Bruno
Richard
Bruno
Craig
On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 11:31 AM, Richard Ruquist
<[email protected]> wrote:
On Tue, Jul 22, 2014 at 4:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
Craig,
You still talk like if I pretended that computationalism is true.
I don't do that, ever.
But you *do* pretend that computationalism is false, and I am
waiting for an argument. I refuted already your basic argument,
which mainly assert that it is obvious, but this is true already
for the machine's first person point of view, and so cannot work
as a valid refutation of comp.
Bruno
Bruno, Are you saying that comp is false for the machine's 1p POV?
I find your paragraph rather confusing.
Richard
Not in some normative sense that you could be implying; as in
"comp is wrong/bad to believe for machine".
For sufficiently rich machine, from their 1p point of view, comp
entails set of 1p beliefs so sophisticated, that it would be
consistent for such machine to assert things like: "What me? A
mere machine? No way, I'm much more high level/smarter/complex
than that. Therefore comp must be false." - Which ISTM is what
Craig keeps asserting, in authoritative sense going even much
further: insisting that we believe him, without going non-comp in
some 3p verifiable way.
Don't know if I grasp your understanding/question though. PGC
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