On 21 Jul 2014, at 18:55, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
> OK. So what separates us then, from dolphins and elephants
Intelligence
I would have said here that what separate us from dolphins and
elephants is typically more competence, notably in the degrees of
freedom of our body through the fingers, like the apes, and then
unlike the apes, the oral cavity and the vocal chords. Such ability
makes possible, and useful, to get tools, and competence, in diverse
way, can grow.
I use the term intelligence in a sense closer to the one discussed by
David Böhm and Krishnamurti. Intelligence is the more a sort of
primitive of competence. Intelligence causes competence, but
competence has a negative feedback on Intelligence.
Competence is very complex, and needs hard works and chance. The
correct theory of competence in the limit exists, and are consequences
of the second recursion theorem.
Intelligence is more simple. It is, I think the natural state of the
virgin universal machine. It is a state of facing/living infinite
degrees of freedom.
Since more recently I am open to the idea that this is already a
conscious state. That one is then related to basically all universal
numbers.
So intelligence is just turing universality, or in term of set of
numbers or formula/belief: Sigma_1 completeness.
Now a universal machine needs another universal machine to be
executed, and with comp, in the 3p it ends in what we did assume at
the start: elementary arithmetic.
> You aren't allowed to respond "Intelligence"
Sorry. Please don't call the cops.
> because intelligence is what makes introspection possible in the
first place.
That's right Kim. (I assume comp all along).
Introspection by itself is not Turing universal though, as shown by
Royer, a student of Case.
3p introspection is defined by the D'x' = 'xx' technic (Kleene's
second recursion theorem, and variant). That leads to a mathematics of
the ideally correct believer, and that G. Then G* adds the annulus of
true but non believable (in that communicable and justifiable way).
The 1p introspection is then offers freely by arithmetic when using
the Theaetetus' definition.
By "==" I mean "corresponds" or "represents"
[]p == believe p. That one can be defined in the language of the
machine. It is the 3p self. It is basically what the doctor will put
on a disk, when proceeding the digital brain transplant.
[]p & p === I know p. That one cannot be defined in the language of
the machine. It is the knower, or soul, or subject of the experience.
Imagine someone NOT believing comp, and in particular believing that
he is NOT duplicable. Then let us duplicate him.
Then it follows that both copies will pretend to be the real one, as
they feel it (with the usual assumptions), and in the first person
sense, they are each right. But both might try to tell you "look I
know that I am the original, I know my doppel will say the same, but
please don't believe him, it's an impostor!" At the metalevel, that is
what []p & p describes, and indeed the machine cannot describes this
in any 3p way, making the statement of those "original" obviously vain
in the 3p justifiable sense, yet absolutely true from the machines'
perspective.
The reason why []p & p cannot be defined in arithmetic is that it
would allow to trap the correct machine into an inconsistency. There
would be a predicate K(x), obeying the S4 axioms, but by Gödel
diagonalisation lemma you would be able to construct a formula k such
that the machine believes k <-> ~K(k). Knowledge cannot be defined in
the language of the machine (and thus neither soul, first person,
etc.), for the same reason you will never find a knight, on the Knight-
Knaves Island of Smullyan, telling you that you will never known that
he is a knight.
Bruno
If that's true then Watson is conscious because Watson engaged in
behavior that if it was performed by a human would certainly be
regarded as intelligent.
> You can can question many things about the content of your
consciousness.
That's true I can, but I have no way of knowing if Kim Jones can do
the same thing.
> A cat can't.
And how do you know that?
> What part of your brain is more evolved than a cat's brain that
allows you to say "I know"?
I'm just guessing but maybe the Neocortex because it's the biggest
anatomical difference between a cat's brain and mine. But I do know
one thing for certain, whatever part it is if it evolved then it
effects behavior; and if it effects behavior then the Turing Test
works for consciousness and not just intelligence.
John K Clark
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