On 28 Jul 2014, at 12:07, Kim Jones wrote:
So do we recognise this thing called a "self" or a "subject" or a
"person" or a "soul" or an "I" or a whatever as something that is
TOTALLY independent of the hosting apparatus?
I don't think so for the 3-self, which *is* the hosting apparatus. It
is the one I denote often by "[]p", and which plays the role of the
"man" in Plotinus ("man" just means non-god, or terrestrial being, ...)
Note that the 3p-self will have a logic (G, and G*)which is (are) NOT
depending of the hosting apparatus, but only on its correctness or its
consistency.
The 1p-self, alias the first person, the soul, S4Grz, []p & p, ... is
independent of the hosting apparatus, except for his/her local
memories (contained in the "[]p" part of the "[]p & p". It is up to
you to recognize it, and may be to recognize as yourself the part
which is universal and common to all conscious beings.
Why should I put up with the ridiculous notion that my brain
secretes my mind which somehow projects my "person"? I don't believe
that for one nanosecond. I am only here to enjoy the ride. If it
turns out that physical reality is where the buck stops then I am
horribly bored by reality. What could possibly be more boring than a
bunch of atoms smugly believing that they are "real" and that
everything that is, must be made from them? What if I don't want to
be made from atoms?
Well, keep in mind that when we do science, or when we try to do
science, we are not supposed to base our assumptions (still less their
conclusion) on what we wish, despite eventually we might learn that it
does perhaps depends practically on what we wish (but we can't wish
that a priori). What if I don't want to obey to the gravitation law?
Well, you can use gravitation to fly, notably thanks to gravitation,
the air, needed for the wings, stay on Earth ...
But, yes, with comp, the person is somehow more real than matter, but
the numbers are in a similar sense more real (more ontologically real,
say) than the person, who is still really real, even if only
epistemologically, like matter.
Bruno
Kim
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