David
On 25 Jul 2014, at 17:37, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 July 2014 22:18, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
To put it another way, there is nobody present for whom it could
represent a difference.
It still exist, or the difference 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... will need
itself a knower to make sense. But > with comp, we don't need more
than the elementary arithmetic truth, to eventually make a >
knower by filtering the truth by a body or a representational set of
beliefs.
Well I think, in a curious way, it may indeed need a knower to make
sense. I'm trying to explain one of my "early morning" intuitions
here, which I find hard to do in an everyday state of consciousness.
I can relate.
And of course it may just be misleading, which is why I'm trying to be
explicit about it. My point is this: comp is explicitly a theory of
consciousness.
OK.
So let's assume that comp is indeed the *correct*
theory of consciousness, and that number relations accurately
represent its "true" ontology. If so, that ontology (as a consequence
of its computational and logical elaborations) *explicitly entails* a
knower, in both the 3p and 1p senses. Indeed, the explicit entailment
of such a knower is ultimately what justifies, or redeems, the
original assumption of the correctness of both the theory (comp) and
its ontological assumptions *as a theory of consciousness*.
Yes, and it implies also the core (non geographical) physics. That
is the physical *laws*. Making the CTM testable.
ISTM then that, if comp is correct, it follows that there is a mutual
entailment: arithmetic<=>consciousness.
yes. let me do a joke. The axioms of arithmetic (RA, or PA,
whatever) entails both
Ex( x = s(0))
and
Ex (x = s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0))))))))))))
But it takes more time to prove the second proposition. But that
time is of course non relevant, like with the FPI, the "time" taken
for the UD to get your consistent comp states is irrelevant by the
delay invariance of the FPI.
So, in the "view from nowhere" (cf nagel), or in the 3p ontology, it
makes sense to say that arithmetic is coexistent with consciousness.
We should perhaps take pause
at this point and contemplate what would be, if true, a
world-shattering discovery. Now let us consider the (by assumption,
counterfactual) case that comp were to have been proved false and
hence that there was NO such mutual entailment. Would it not be, at
the least, inconsistent to take exactly the same view of arithmetic in
that case? Could arithmetic continue to represent, so to speak,
exactly the "same thing" for us? If not, then (assuming comp), there
may indeed be an unavoidable sense in which it might indeed require a
knower to "make sense" even of basic number relations.
If comp is false, then arithmetic will represent an ocean of
zombies, as even if comp is wrong, arithmetic will continue to
emulate the behavior of all machines, including our current
conversation.
By the same line of argument, if comp is correct, it would follow that
bare physicalism (i.e. without supernumerary computational
assumptions) fails as a correct theory of consciousness precisely
because, properly understood, its ontology doesn't entail or require
the existence of a knower.
A computationalist (unaware of UDA-MGA) can argue (like Brent) that
the physical reality can emulate the abstract person behavior, and
argue that it is not a zombie, by invoking the reality of the
computation based on its primitive materiality. But MGA shows that
this is invoking something magical, non Turing emulable, nor FPI-
recoverable, just to block a consequence of CTM, logic and arithmetic.
IOW, such a theory can't help but "sweep
the first-person under the rug".
Which honest people like Dennett eventually do, which is astonishing
for someone interested in consciousness.
In this case the absence of a knower
nullifies, rather than justifying or redeeming, the postulated
ontology. And this limitation may be a direct consequence of any
theory that is explicitly about what is observable (tacitly assuming a
God's-eye knower/interpreter) as distinct from a theory of observation
(explicitly embracing a theory of what is observable).
I agree. Physicists only measure numbers, and infer relations
between measurable numbers, and that's OK. But when they refer those
number relation to real quanta and real qualia, they just use a link
which is no more working when we take CTM seriously into account,
making both quanta and qualia completely obscure.
We the computational histories existe "logically" before the
consciousness flux differentiate > into knower interpreting
themselves, if we want use the computation as defined in the usual 3p
theoretical computer science.
I agree, but if my preceding argument has any merit, the logical
existence of the computational histories and the differentiation of
the consciousness flux into self-interpreting knowers are not
logically independent, but rather *mutually dependent*.
OK. But as Brent say, that might be the case with the physical
reality, except for the difficulties this bring in the mind-body
relationships.
In that case there could be no effective distinction between "Deep
Blue" and its physical > reduction,
Why? That's not true. In UD* Deep blue has the time to play
basically all chess games, > perhaps even with all humans,
much before the UD get the simulation of our good "real blue" at >
the level of the atoms of its late real "incarnation".
Well, I trust you may have begun to get my drift by now. My claim is
that (assuming comp) Deep Blue, considered as an entity distinct from
its many reductions within UD*, is ultimately dependent (as is each
and every aspect of the comp schema) on the mutual entailment of
arithmetic and the conscious knower.
OK.
As I said, this dependency is
sometimes difficult to appreciate because we tacitly smuggle God in as
the "default knower" that continues to observe and "interpret" Deep
Blue even in the (counterfactual) case that there is no other possible
observer/interpreter. This tacit supernumerary assumption is what may
make it seem plausible that there is no need of a knower for such a
distinction to be relevant (i.e. that realism about Deep Blue is
justified in the absence of any possible knower).
I can make sense of this. Yet, in the TOE extracted from comp, we
can forget such a knower, as we don't really need to know if P or ~P
is true, just that it is true independently of us (little ego). But
any epistemic view on such a P requires a knower. It is an open
question to me if it makes sense to say that the ultimate truth
(arithmetical truth) is really a knower or not.
The soul has a third person origin, even God has a third person
origin, as the outer God is a > "complete" 3p reality (arithmetical
truth, or the sigma_1 part).
Again, I agree. Indeed ISTM that this is an absolutely essential
aspect of any theory that has any hope of being a correct "theory of
everything", as I keep trying to point out to Craig. But my argument
is that we must surely treat every part of the theory - formal or
informal, 3p or 1p - with equal seriousness.
Yes.
Thus it is essential that
there be a "complete" 3p reality that is coterminous with a specific
aspect of arithmetical truth. But it is equally essential that this 3p
reality is complemented, one might even say "redeemed", as a TOE, by
the further entailment of the explicitly 1p logical modalities of the
conscious knower.
I think so.
So it is only with comp's 1p apotheosis, in the form
of those modalities and that knower, that we can see the sense in
which fire can finally be breathed into the equations.
Exactly. And incompleteness protects exactly this, already for the
simple *à-la-Theaetetus type of knowledge*.
As crazy as it might seem at first, the modal formal logics
S4Grz(1), and the X1* logics, meta-formalize notions which are
provably not definable in the language of the machine.
Incompleteness saves the ancient's intuition that knowledge is not a
propositional attitude with what Gerson called the "standard
treatment of knowledge".
What might prevent us from seeing this is that we can't help
imagining the proposed scenario > from a God's-eye perspective. God
then takes the role of the knower and "sees" that Deep > Blue is
still there. Thus we have unwittingly justified our ascription of
"Deep Blue" to some > aspect of the generalised ontology by
"divine retrospection".
That makes sense. The outer God gave rise to the inner God which
contemplate the outer > God, and eventually they can join, and
separate again, in the course of many lives, inside and > in between
people.
Exactly. I think that seeing this may help to clarify my meaning. I
hope.
I think I see it well now. I intuit something similar, and even
something stronger (coming from salvia), which I can feel as making
comp wrong, ... but I think that is still only in some 1p view. This
is going in the direction that the real knower *is* arithmetical 1p-
truth, the "p" in []p & p, and that the body or representation, or
belief, []p is filtering consciousness.
If this is true, there should be account of people saying that they
felt being "more conscious" when some part of the brain is
destroyed, or made non-functional, and that seems to be the case,
both with dissociative drugs, but also with people lacking the hypo-
campus: they definitely feel something more in the form of a
perpetual presence. Brains do not produce consciousness, it would
reduce consciousness, by filtering it through the differentiation of
histories. Dying (with amnesia) would become a platonist remembering
of our universal consciousness. The two way road between Earth and
Heaven would be amnesia, in both direction, like salvia suggests.
I am rereading the Quran and the Bhagavad Gita, it might help for
this.
Cool :-)
Not sure. God punishes me by making me abandon my bag with my Quran
and the Bhagavad-Gita in some tram (with also my keys, money, the
Gerson book, and the very rare "Deux esquisses de logique" by Rosser
(and my diary n° 15 of my salvia experiences).
But you may be right, as God changed his mind, and sent a cop at my
home at 3 o'clock in the morning, with my bag, and everything in it
(including also some cannabis and salvia!). Quite efficacious the
police here, very gentle too.
Yes, that's cool :)
Bruno
David
On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:59, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 July 2014 18:25, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a
threshold of relative complexity, the lower level is not relevant
for the description of the higher level. It would be like asking
"why Obama has been elected?", and getting back the answer:
everything followed the SWE.
Hmm...Well, I originally suggested that the knower *couldn't* simply
be reduced to computation or numbers, unlike the case of physical
reducibility. In my view, the presence of a 1p knower is what
"retrospectively" justifies realism about higher-level 3p structures
with which the knower is to be associated. To see what I mean, let's
assume that there is some putative ontology that can't in principle
be used to justify the presence of such a knower. Any higher-level
scenario conceived in terms of such an ontology is then vulnerable
to a particularly pernicious species of "zombie reductionism". It
isn't merely that the radical absence of first person-hood leaves in
its wake nothing but zombies with 3p functional bodies but no
"consciousness". It's much more radical than that. The zombie body
is now radically lacking in "existence-for-itself". Consequently,
the distinction between any such putative "body" and its ontological
reduction is a differentiation without a difference. To put it
another way, there is nobody present for whom it could represent a
difference.
It still exist, or the difference 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... will need
itself a knower to make sense. But with comp, we don't need more
than the elementary arithmetic truth, to eventually make a knower by
filtering the truth by a body or a representational set of beliefs.
Rough artificial cops on the road, made in woods are zombies, but
their existence still makes senses in the 3p, for a putative
observer present of not.
We the computational histories existe "logically" before the
consciousness flux differentiate into knower interpreting
themselves, if we want use the computation as defined in the usual
3p theoretical computer science.
I realise this may be difficult to accept, for example in the case
of Deep Blue that you posed to me. However, imagine re-posing this
case with respect to an ontology with which (let us assume) a knower
could not *in principle* be associated.
That might not be as easy as you think, but let us see.
In that case there could be no effective distinction between "Deep
Blue" and its physical reduction,
Why? That's not true. In UD* Deep blue has the time to play
basically all chess games, perhaps even with all humans, much before
the UD get the simulation of our good "real blue" at the level of
the atoms of its late real "incarnation".
Even in the 3p, Deep blue is already more in its code, goal,
strategies, examples, and high level skills, like his elementary
belief in a the token of the game, the position on the chessboard.
Even that "abstract guy" would "survive", if we implement it in the
Babbage machine. It is not a knower in the comp sense, because it
has no well defined set of beliefs that he can express, but it might
already experience something, hard to say without looking at the
code (I think it is still in large part brut force, and that it does
not represent itself to play, so we have not enough to apply
Theaetetus).
since we have ruled out, by assumption, the possibility of persons
to whom this could represent a difference.
Except the difference between being, and not being, relatively to
some universal reality.
The soul has a third person origin, even God has a third person
origin, as the outer God is a "complete" 3p reality (arithmetical
truth, or the sigma_1 part).
What might prevent us from seeing this is that we can't help
imagining the proposed scenario from a God's-eye perspective. God
then takes the role of the knower and "sees" that Deep Blue is still
there. Thus we have unwittingly justified our ascription of "Deep
Blue" to some aspect of the generalised ontology by "divine
retrospection".
That makes sense. The outer God gave rise to the inner God which
contemplate the outer God, and eventually they can join, and
separate again, in the course of many lives, inside and in between
people.
With comp the outer god, "the ontological basic reality" is a 3p
structure, just enough infinite. It is an open question if this is
conscious, and "willing". Plotinus also has difficulty there. I
guess it is the abramanic jump, ... open question. I search.
I am rereading the Quran and the Bhagavad Gita, it might help for
this.
Bruno
David
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