On 4 August 2014 11:16, Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 4 Aug 2014, at 4:50 am, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a > person can exist independently of any memories. That's why he says things > like, "We're all the same person." I find this theory contrary to > experience. I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly > did not seem to be the same person as when they could remember things. > > > > Brent > > Hang on. > > Bruno says we are "the same person" in the Krishnamurti sense of "there IS > ONLY one person". Not in the sense of "the self appears the same to > others." Which is the shareable 3p version you are reporting. They didn't > seem this way to others whose memory was still intact - sure. Surely this > is the point. How things seem is not necessarily how things are. The 1p > version of what they underwent is incommunicable. Now if we are "all one" > (Ommmmmmmmmm......) then this makes sense because it is only one > computational stream and only relates to 1p anyway. > > Ah, thank you for putting your finger on what was bothering me about Brent's post (i.e. that he was describing 3p experiences...and as you say, comp (or even quantum suicide) is "1p unsharable").
I though Bruno's "all are one" idea wasn't part of "core comp" though, but an (even more) hypothetical offshoot? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
