On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote: >> >> On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person >>> after-experiences. >>> >> >> Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie. >> >> > In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry', >>> >> >> Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and one >> will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were symmetrical >> there would only be one person regardless of how many bodies there were; >> there needs to be a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to >> be meaningful. You and I are two different people because things are >> unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not; In the >> thought experiment things are a little more complicated because the >> Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does >> not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such >> as the memory of seeing Moscow. >> >> >> Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a >> person can exist independently of any memories. >> > > Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the > conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain > activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a baby becomes > conscious. At that moment they form their first memory and exist as a > conscious entity without any previous memories. > > > How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become conscious? > What does "they" mean before consciousness? The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of memory, then any form of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion becoms a bit moot... > Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not just > come into being like switching on a light; rather they are built up by a > combination of genetics and experiences. > In the sense of personality, I agree. In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or nothing threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe I remember my first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific claim, of course and I will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your own introspection and I can't complain if you arrive at different conclusions. > > > >> That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find >> this theory contrary to experience. >> > > It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies > you-ness. > > > ??? It doesn't imply sameness. > I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are all the same person but appear different due to experience is consistent with the experience of you being your own person separate from me. > > > > >> I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not >> seem to be the same person as when they could remember things. >> > > Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as > present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember > being 5 year old Brent. > > > Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories. And > in which I am not Telmo or Bruno. > That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is that, if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI style duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly consistent with empirical experience, including Alzheimers and childhood memories. I am not claiming emergentism is wrong, I am just claiming you have no reason to prefer emergentism over "we are all the same person". I do apologize if my thoughts are a bit disorganized. Telmo. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
