On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person
after-experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and one
will not,
nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were symmetrical there would
only be
one person regardless of how many bodies there were; there needs to be a
break in
symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to be meaningful. You and I are
two
different people because things are unsymmetrical, we both have memories
that the
other does not; In the thought experiment things are a little more
complicated
because the Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington
Man)
does not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not,
such as
the memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a person
can
exist independently of any memories.
Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the conventional
neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain activity. Then, there is
some moment after birth when a baby becomes conscious. At that moment they form their
first memory and exist as a conscious entity without any previous memories.
How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become conscious? Or more likely
the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not just come into being like switching
on a light; rather they are built up by a combination of genetics and experiences.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find this
theory
contrary to experience.
It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies you-ness.
??? It doesn't imply sameness.
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not seem
to be the
same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as present day Brent
to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember being 5 year old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories. And in which I am
not Telmo or Bruno.
Brent
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