On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 7:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> > Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person >>>> after-experiences. >>>> >>> >>> Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie. >>> >>> > In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry', >>>> >>> >>> Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and >>> one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were symmetrical >>> there would only be one person regardless of how many bodies there were; >>> there needs to be a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to >>> be meaningful. You and I are two different people because things are >>> unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not; In the >>> thought experiment things are a little more complicated because the >>> Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does >>> not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such >>> as the memory of seeing Moscow. >>> >>> >>> Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a >>> person can exist independently of any memories. >>> >> >> Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the >> conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain >> activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a baby becomes >> conscious. At that moment they form their first memory and exist as a >> conscious entity without any previous memories. >> >> >> How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become >> conscious? >> > > What does "they" mean before consciousness? > > > The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..." > > > The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of > memory, then any form of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion > becoms a bit moot... > > >> Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not just >> come into being like switching on a light; rather they are built up by a >> combination of genetics and experiences. >> > > In the sense of personality, I agree. > In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or > nothing threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe > I remember my first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific > claim, of course and I will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your > own introspection and I can't complain if you arrive at different > conclusions. > > > I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection, e.g. my > dog is conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping spider. And > introspection is not all-or-nothing. As John Clark has noted, you can > introspectively observed that you are introspectively observing...but > beyond that you quickly run out of introspection. And the reason is easy > to see, we cannot introspectively observe the firing of neurons or the > diffusion across synapses. > I don't really have a problem with this. I don't think that introspection and consciousness are the same thing. > > > > >> >> >> >>> That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find >>> this theory contrary to experience. >>> >> >> It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies >> you-ness. >> >> >> ??? It doesn't imply sameness. >> > > I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of > experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are all > the same person but appear different due to experience is consistent with > the experience of you being your own person separate from me. > > > Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same" is > redefined to mean "different". > I would say that our potential disagreement on definitions is on "person". > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not >>> seem to be the same person as when they could remember things. >>> >> >> Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as >> present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember >> being 5 year old Brent. >> >> >> Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories. >> And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno. >> > > That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is > that, if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI style > duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly consistent with > empirical experience, including Alzheimers and childhood memories. > > > Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one > that is useful to Depak Chopra. > Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem? > However it is not very useful to serious people trying to cure > Alzheimers. > Not is a David Lynch movie useful to reduce obesity. What's your point exactly? Telmo. > > Brent > > > I am not claiming emergentism is wrong, I am just claiming you have no > reason to prefer emergentism over "we are all the same person". > > I do apologize if my thoughts are a bit disorganized. > > Telmo. > > >> >> Brent >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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