On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person
after-experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and one
will
not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were symmetrical
there would
only be one person regardless of how many bodies there were; there
needs to be
a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to be
meaningful. You
and I are two different people because things are unsymmetrical, we
both have
memories that the other does not; In the thought experiment things are a
little more complicated because the Helsinki Man has no memories that
the
Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does not, but the Moscow Man DOES have
memories
the Helsinki Man does not, such as the memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a
person can
exist independently of any memories.
Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the
conventional
neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain activity.
Then, there
is some moment after birth when a baby becomes conscious. At that moment
they form
their first memory and exist as a conscious entity without any previous
memories.
How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become conscious?
What does "they" mean before consciousness?
The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..."
The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of memory, then any form
of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion becoms a bit moot...
Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not just
come into
being like switching on a light; rather they are built up by a combination
of
genetics and experiences.
In the sense of personality, I agree.
In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or nothing threshold.
I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe I remember my first moment of
consciousness). This is not a scientific claim, of course and I will not try to defend
it. You'll have to do your own introspection and I can't complain if you arrive at
different conclusions.
I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection, e.g. my dog is
conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping spider. And introspection is not
all-or-nothing. As John Clark has noted, you can introspectively observed that you are
introspectively observing...but beyond that you quickly run out of introspection. And the
reason is easy to see, we cannot introspectively observe the firing of neurons or the
diffusion across synapses.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find
this
theory contrary to experience.
It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies you-ness.
??? It doesn't imply sameness.
I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of experience is what
creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are all the same person but appear
different due to experience is consistent with the experience of you being your own
person separate from me.
Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same" is redefined to mean
"different".
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not
seem to
be the same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as
present day
Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember being 5 year
old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories. And
in which
I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is that, if we
assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI style duplications, we get a
reality that is also exactly consistent with empirical experience, including Alzheimers
and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one that is useful to
Depak Chopra. However it is not very useful to serious people trying to cure Alzheimers.
Brent
I am not claiming emergentism is wrong, I am just claiming you have no reason to prefer
emergentism over "we are all the same person".
I do apologize if my thoughts are a bit disorganized.
Telmo.
Brent
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