On 04 Aug 2014, at 01:33, LizR wrote:
On 4 August 2014 11:16, Kim Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 4 Aug 2014, at 4:50 am, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that
a person can exist independently of any memories. That's why he
says things like, "We're all the same person." I find this theory
contrary to experience. I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers
and they certainly did not seem to be the same person as when they
could remember things.
>
> Brent
Hang on.
Bruno says we are "the same person" in the Krishnamurti sense of
"there IS ONLY one person". Not in the sense of "the self appears
the same to others." Which is the shareable 3p version you are
reporting. They didn't seem this way to others whose memory was
still intact - sure. Surely this is the point. How things seem is
not necessarily how things are. The 1p version of what they
underwent is incommunicable. Now if we are "all
one" (Ommmmmmmmmm......) then this makes sense because it is only
one computational stream and only relates to 1p anyway.
Ah, thank you for putting your finger on what was bothering me about
Brent's post (i.e. that he was describing 3p experiences...and as
you say, comp (or even quantum suicide) is "1p unsharable").
Well, actually, it is 1p-plural sharable, though. Just do the quantum
suicide with a friend, or do the WM-duplication with a friend,
entering with you in the box. In that way, your memories will be
correlated locally with his memories, and you can bet (on W and M),
and win or lost the bet in the usual 'deutsch book' sense of
probability.
I though Bruno's "all are one" idea wasn't part of "core comp"
though, but an (even more) hypothetical offshoot?
Yes, it is more hypothetical, and it is not used in anything I did in
the PhD thesis. This has nothing to do with the reversal.
Now, comp is not that "hypothetical", it is the (sometimes but not
always) implicit hypothesis of the rationalists, materialists,
atheists, Everetists, and most biologists, philosophers of mind,
cognitivists, etc. Of course, few are aware that the usual mind-brain
link stop to work in the comp setting. I would have guess that the
everetists are the one closer to that understanding, but then look at
Tegmark. His paper on consciousness show that he did not see the
embryo of a consciousness theory in the Everett view of QM.
Bruno
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