On 8/4/2014 4:23 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 7:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person
after-experiences.
Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie.
> In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry',
Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and
one
will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were
symmetrical
there would only be one person regardless of how many bodies there
were;
there needs to be a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and
"me"
to be meaningful. You and I are two different people because things
are
unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not; In the
thought experiment things are a little more complicated because the
Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington
Man) does
not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does
not,
such as the memory of seeing Moscow.
Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a
person can exist independently of any memories.
Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the
conventional
neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain activity.
Then,
there is some moment after birth when a baby becomes conscious. At that
moment
they form their first memory and exist as a conscious entity without any
previous memories.
How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become
conscious?
What does "they" mean before consciousness?
The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..."
The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of memory,
then any
form of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion becoms a bit
moot...
Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not
just come
into being like switching on a light; rather they are built up by a
combination
of genetics and experiences.
In the sense of personality, I agree.
In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or
nothing
threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe I
remember my
first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific claim, of course
and I
will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your own introspection and I
can't
complain if you arrive at different conclusions.
I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection, e.g. my
dog is
conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping spider. And
introspection is
not all-or-nothing. As John Clark has noted, you can introspectively
observed that
you are introspectively observing...but beyond that you quickly run out of
introspection. And the reason is easy to see, we cannot introspectively
observe the
firing of neurons or the diffusion across synapses.
I don't really have a problem with this. I don't think that introspection and
consciousness are the same thing.
That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I
find this
theory contrary to experience.
It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies
you-ness.
??? It doesn't imply sameness.
I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of
experience is
what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are all the same
person but
appear different due to experience is consistent with the experience of you
being
your own person separate from me.
Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same" is
redefined to
mean "different".
I would say that our potential disagreement on definitions is on "person".
I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did
not seem
to be the same person as when they could remember things.
Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as
present
day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember being
5 year
old Brent.
Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories.
And in
which I am not Telmo or Bruno.
That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is
that, if we
assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI style duplications,
we get
a reality that is also exactly consistent with empirical experience,
including
Alzheimers and childhood memories.
Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one that
is
useful to Depak Chopra.
Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem?
Sure. That consciousness is an immaterial substance that separates from the body at
death, and can in some cases travel instantaneously to distance places, see and hear
things, and return to the body which it controls while the body is alive. Unfortunately
all tests of this theory have failed to confirm it.
However it is not very useful to serious people trying to cure Alzheimers.
Not is a David Lynch movie useful to reduce obesity. What's your point exactly?
That a good theory of consciousness should be useful for treating people with
mental problems.
Brent
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