On Tue, Aug 5, 2014 at 8:05 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 05 Aug 2014, at 01:23, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 7:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 8/4/2014 6:15 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:37 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 8/3/2014 5:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 7:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/3/2014 9:04 AM, John Clark wrote: >>>> >>>> On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> > Exactly what John Clark seems to miss, the first person >>>>> after-experiences. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Oh yes, that's because John Clark is a Zombie. >>>> >>>> > In both diaries, those who predicted 'no break of symmetry', >>>>> >>>> >>>> Who in hell predicted no break of symmetry? One will see Moscow and >>>> one will not, nobody thinks that is symmetrical. If things were symmetrical >>>> there would only be one person regardless of how many bodies there were; >>>> there needs to be a break in symmetry for the concepts of "you" and "me" to >>>> be meaningful. You and I are two different people because things are >>>> unsymmetrical, we both have memories that the other does not; In the >>>> thought experiment things are a little more complicated because the >>>> Helsinki Man has no memories that the Moscow Man (or Washington Man) does >>>> not, but the Moscow Man DOES have memories the Helsinki Man does not, such >>>> as the memory of seeing Moscow. >>>> >>>> >>>> Bruno seems to have a theory, based on his salvia experience, that a >>>> person can exist independently of any memories. >>>> >>> >>> Perhaps ironically, ISTM this is trivially true if you accept the >>> conventional neuroscience hypothesis that consciousness emerges from brain >>> activity. Then, there is some moment after birth when a baby becomes >>> conscious. At that moment they form their first memory and exist as a >>> conscious entity without any previous memories. >>> >>> >>> How do you know they don't first form a memory and then become >>> conscious? >>> >> >> What does "they" mean before consciousness? >> >> >> The same as in "At that moment they form their first memory..." >> >> >> The lump of molecules? If we allow for this broader definition of >> memory, then any form of stigmergy counts as memories and this discussion >> becoms a bit moot... >> >> >>> Or more likely the person, in the sense of personality, doesn't not >>> just come into being like switching on a light; rather they are built up by >>> a combination of genetics and experiences. >>> >> >> In the sense of personality, I agree. >> In the sense of actually being conscious, I believe there's an all or >> nothing threshold. I believe this due to personal introspection (I believe >> I remember my first moment of consciousness). This is not a scientific >> claim, of course and I will not try to defend it. You'll have to do your >> own introspection and I can't complain if you arrive at different >> conclusions. >> >> >> I disagree. I think there is consciousness without introspection, e.g. >> my dog is conscious in this way and maybe even Bruno's jumping spider. And >> introspection is not all-or-nothing. As John Clark has noted, you can >> introspectively observed that you are introspectively observing...but >> beyond that you quickly run out of introspection. And the reason is easy >> to see, we cannot introspectively observe the firing of neurons or the >> diffusion across synapses. >> > > I don't really have a problem with this. I don't think that introspection > and consciousness are the same thing. > > > I agree. Consciousness is not propositional. It is the truth that you know > that there is at least one truth or one reality. You might not know what it > is, or what is its nature, but you know, even for sure, that there is > something. Worms know this, I guess. > That happens already at the robinsonian degree. > > Introspection happen at the löbian degree, where the machine has more > self-awareness, both its believability predicate and its knowability > operator verifies []p -> [][]p. This leads to "self-consciousness", which > can lead to more delusion, actually. > > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> That's why he says things like, "We're all the same person." I find >>>> this theory contrary to experience. >>>> >>> >>> It cannot possibly be contrary to experience. Experience implies >>> you-ness. >>> >>> >>> ??? It doesn't imply sameness. >>> >> >> I'm not saying it does. What I am saying is that the very concept of >> experience is what creates the feeling of "you". The claim that we are all >> the same person but appear different due to experience is consistent with >> the experience of you being your own person separate from me. >> >> >> Yes, it's consistent with us all being the same person when "same" is >> redefined to mean "different". >> > > I would say that our potential disagreement on definitions is on "person". > > > > For the reasoning, one need only the notion of first person defined in > term of memory content taken by the experiencer in the tele-box. > > For the math part, we can concentrate on machine which believes in RA and > PA, and are ideally correct (like PA is, imho). > > Once you accept the digital brain, a person can understand that he/she is > not her body, as she can change her body everything hour if she wants. > > The person is an abstract immaterial, and plausibly high level > arithmetical being, (with comp), but this leads to the (interesting, I > think) problem of recovering the physical laws by the FPI on the sigma_1 > sentences. > > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> I've had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they certainly did not >>>> seem to be the same person as when they could remember things. >>>> >>> >>> Do you figure 5 year old Brent would appear to be the same person as >>> present day Brent to an external observer? Yet you can probably remember >>> being 5 year old Brent. >>> >>> >>> Exactly the sense in which I'm that person by continuity of memories. >>> And in which I am not Telmo or Bruno. >>> >> >> That's the rational conclusion if we assume emergentism. The trouble is >> that, if we assume we are all the same person going through MWI/FPI style >> duplications, we get a reality that is also exactly consistent with >> empirical experience, including Alzheimers and childhood memories. >> >> >> Exactly. By redefining "same" we create an untestable theory, but one >> that is useful to Depak Chopra. >> > > Do you know of a testable theory that addresses the hard problem? > > > Classical computationalism. The solution is that G* proves []p <-> []p & > p, but the machine cannot believe it, still less know it. > For the qualia, and perhaps the quanta, you need the weaker versions: []p > <-> []p & <>p & p, or [] & <>p <-> []p & <>p & p. > Ok, but is this falsifiable in the Popperian sense? Best Telmo > > Bruno > > > > >> However it is not very useful to serious people trying to cure >> Alzheimers. >> > > Not is a David Lynch movie useful to reduce obesity. What's your point > exactly? > > > > > > > > > > Telmo. > > >> >> Brent >> >> >> I am not claiming emergentism is wrong, I am just claiming you have no >> reason to prefer emergentism over "we are all the same person". >> >> I do apologize if my thoughts are a bit disorganized. >> >> Telmo. >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
