2015-03-25 16:35 GMT+01:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>: > > > On Wednesday, March 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> 2015-03-25 12:25 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>: >> >>> >>> >>> 2015-03-25 12:09 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>: >>> >>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>> >>>>> Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected] <mailto: >>>>> [email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>> > Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto: >>>>> [email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>> > > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish" <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>> > >> > >>>>> > >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux >>>>> wrote: >>>>> > >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>> > >> > > >>>>> > >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial input, >>>>> by hypothesis >>>>> > >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the >>>>> inputs came from >>>>> > >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't tell >>>>> as it receives >>>>> > >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but *exactly* >>>>> the same. So >>>>> > >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or none >>>>> are. >>>>> > >> > >>>>> > >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer >>>>> moments no >>>>> > >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and replayed, >>>>> whatever). >>>>> > >> > >>>>> > >> > Cheers >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false... >>>>> > > >>>>> >>>>>> How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from >>>>>> producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be two >>>>>> different instances of the physical process producing the same conscious >>>>>> thoughts. >>>>>> >>>>>> If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only >>>>> one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical >>>>> supervenience, it's the physical token that generates consciousness. So if >>>>> ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the cpnsciuous able >>>>> program with the correct inputs, >>>>> >>>>> Because there is only one conscious moment >>>>> >>>>> then you reject physical supervenience. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain >>>> states. It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain wetware or in >>>> an accurate record of these brain states on a film or in a computer memory. >>>> It is the states (or sequence of states) that makes up the conscious >>>> experience. If the record is exact, then replaying it reproduces exactly >>>> the initial conscious experience (as Russell points out), not some other >>>> experience. >>>> >>> >>> Yes... that's what I said... replaying it N times under physical >>> supervenience means you have N times the conscious moment supervening on >>> the substrate *in realtime* (exactly the same conscious moment) but it is >>> instantiated N times, not only once... (when I say realtime, it's not that >>> the inner time of the conscious moment should be one to one with the >>> external time where that conscious moment is supervening, but that the >>> conscious moment exists at the same time it is running) (as Russel seems to >>> say). >>> >>> >> Correction as Russel seems to say there is only one conscious moment... >> how many time you run it... well under physical supervenience you have N >> times exactly the same conscious moment... but each run is as real and >> existing as the other... and there is not only one... saying there is only >> one is rejecting physical supervenience. >> > > If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know which one > of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered moment was run on one > or other or my next anticipated moment will be run on one or other. If one > computer stops it makes no difference to me and if a third computer running > my mind comes online it makes no difference to me. So effectively there is > only one conscious moment. >
No, there are as many (same) conscious moments as there are instances running in "realtime" on the physical substrate *under physical supervenience*... that these conscious moments are exactly the same doesn't change that... only from an idealist POV can you say there is only one. Quentin > Under physical supervenience, stopping all the computers stops the > conscious moment. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
