On 25 Mar 2015, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/25/2015 9:15 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-03-25 16:35 GMT+01:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>:
On Wednesday, March 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>
wrote:
2015-03-25 12:25 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>:
2015-03-25 12:09 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> a écrit :
> Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> a écrit :
> > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>
> >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish" <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux
wrote:
> >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> a écrit :
> >> > >
> >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial
input, by hypothesis
> >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the
inputs came from
> >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't
tell as it receives
> >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but
*exactly* the same. So
> >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or
none are.
> >> >
> >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer
moments no
> >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and
replayed, whatever).
> >> >
> >> > Cheers
> >>
> >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false...
> >
How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from
producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be
two different instances of the physical process producing the same
conscious thoughts.
If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only
one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical
supervenience, it's the physical token that generates
consciousness. So if ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times
you run the cpnsciuous able program with the correct inputs,
Because there is only one conscious moment
then you reject physical supervenience.
I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain
states. It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain
wetware or in an accurate record of these brain states on a film or
in a computer memory. It is the states (or sequence of states) that
makes up the conscious experience. If the record is exact, then
replaying it reproduces exactly the initial conscious experience
(as Russell points out), not some other experience.
Yes... that's what I said... replaying it N times under physical
supervenience means you have N times the conscious moment
supervening on the substrate *in realtime* (exactly the same
conscious moment) but it is instantiated N times, not only once...
(when I say realtime, it's not that the inner time of the conscious
moment should be one to one with the external time
where that conscious moment is
supervening, but that the conscious moment exists at the same time
it is running) (as Russel seems to say).
Correction as Russel seems to say there is only one conscious
moment... how many time you run it... well under physical
supervenience you have N times exactly the same conscious moment...
but each run is as real and existing as the other... and there is
not only one... saying there is only one is rejecting physical
supervenience.
If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know
which one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered
moment was run on one or other or my next anticipated moment will
be run on one or other. If one computer stops it makes no
difference to me and if a third computer running my mind comes
online it makes no difference to me. So effectively there is only
one conscious moment.
No, there are as many (same) conscious moments as there are
instances running in "realtime" on the physical substrate *under
physical supervenience*... that these conscious moments are exactly
the same doesn't change that... only from an idealist POV can you
say there is only one.
But that's what the MGA is arguing for - an idealist POV.
I can agree. But it is an objective one, derived from RA, with the
comp mind-body in the background.
The physical realities emerges from the math of dreams, but the dreams
emerges from the math of computations and computability/non-
computability.
It is post Church-Turing-Post-Gödel idealism. But it is close to
neoplatonists idealism, and match with mystical reports, if not taken
too much literally.
Above all, it is testable.
Bruno
I have to go.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
