2015-03-25 21:08 GMT+01:00 meekerdb <[email protected]>: > On 3/25/2015 9:15 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > 2015-03-25 16:35 GMT+01:00 Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>: > >> >> >> On Wednesday, March 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> 2015-03-25 12:25 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> 2015-03-25 12:09 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>: >>>> >>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected] <mailto: >>>>>> [email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>>> > Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto: >>>>>> [email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>>> > > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish" < >>>>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> > >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>>>>> > >> > > >>>>>> > >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial input, >>>>>> by hypothesis >>>>>> > >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the >>>>>> inputs came from >>>>>> > >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't tell >>>>>> as it receives >>>>>> > >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but *exactly* >>>>>> the same. So >>>>>> > >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or none >>>>>> are. >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer >>>>>> moments no >>>>>> > >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and replayed, >>>>>> whatever). >>>>>> > >> > >>>>>> > >> > Cheers >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false... >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >>>>>>> How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from >>>>>>> producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be two >>>>>>> different instances of the physical process producing the same conscious >>>>>>> thoughts. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only >>>>>> one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical >>>>>> supervenience, it's the physical token that generates consciousness. So >>>>>> if >>>>>> ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the cpnsciuous able >>>>>> program with the correct inputs, >>>>>> >>>>>> Because there is only one conscious moment >>>>>> >>>>>> then you reject physical supervenience. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain >>>>> states. It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain wetware or >>>>> in >>>>> an accurate record of these brain states on a film or in a computer >>>>> memory. >>>>> It is the states (or sequence of states) that makes up the conscious >>>>> experience. If the record is exact, then replaying it reproduces exactly >>>>> the initial conscious experience (as Russell points out), not some other >>>>> experience. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes... that's what I said... replaying it N times under physical >>>> supervenience means you have N times the conscious moment supervening on >>>> the substrate *in realtime* (exactly the same conscious moment) but it is >>>> instantiated N times, not only once... (when I say realtime, it's not that >>>> the inner time of the conscious moment should be one to one with the >>>> external time where that conscious moment is supervening, but that the >>>> conscious moment exists at the same time it is running) (as Russel seems to >>>> say). >>>> >>>> >>> Correction as Russel seems to say there is only one conscious >>> moment... how many time you run it... well under physical supervenience you >>> have N times exactly the same conscious moment... but each run is as real >>> and existing as the other... and there is not only one... saying there is >>> only one is rejecting physical supervenience. >>> >> >> If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know which >> one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered moment was run on >> one or other or my next anticipated moment will be run on one or other. If >> one computer stops it makes no difference to me and if a third computer >> running my mind comes online it makes no difference to me. So effectively >> there is only one conscious moment. >> > > No, there are as many (same) conscious moments as there are instances > running in "realtime" on the physical substrate *under physical > supervenience*... that these conscious moments are exactly the same doesn't > change that... only from an idealist POV can you say there is only one. > > > But that's what the MGA is arguing for - an idealist POV. >
Yes and ? I was explaining physical supervenience and how if you accept it and at the same time you believe in computationalism, you are forced by MGA to acknowledge that the consciousness must supervene on the movie + broken gates. Quentin > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
