2015-03-25 12:25 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>: > > > 2015-03-25 12:09 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>: > >> Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected] <mailto: >>> [email protected]>> a écrit : >>> > Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto: >>> [email protected]>> a écrit : >>> > > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> > >> >>> > >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish" <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> > >> > >>> > >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >>> > >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit : >>> > >> > > >>> > >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial input, by >>> hypothesis >>> > >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the >>> inputs came from >>> > >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't tell as >>> it receives >>> > >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but *exactly* >>> the same. So >>> > >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or none are. >>> > >> > >>> > >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer moments >>> no >>> > >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and replayed, >>> whatever). >>> > >> > >>> > >> > Cheers >>> > >> >>> > >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false... >>> > > >>> >>>> How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from >>>> producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be two >>>> different instances of the physical process producing the same conscious >>>> thoughts. >>>> >>>> If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only >>> one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical >>> supervenience, it's the physical token that generates consciousness. So if >>> ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the cpnsciuous able >>> program with the correct inputs, >>> >>> Because there is only one conscious moment >>> >>> then you reject physical supervenience. >>> >> >> I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain >> states. It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain wetware or in >> an accurate record of these brain states on a film or in a computer memory. >> It is the states (or sequence of states) that makes up the conscious >> experience. If the record is exact, then replaying it reproduces exactly >> the initial conscious experience (as Russell points out), not some other >> experience. >> > > Yes... that's what I said... replaying it N times under physical > supervenience means you have N times the conscious moment supervening on > the substrate *in realtime* (exactly the same conscious moment) but it is > instantiated N times, not only once... (when I say realtime, it's not that > the inner time of the conscious moment should be one to one with the > external time where that conscious moment is supervening, but that the > conscious moment exists at the same time it is running) (as Russel seems to > say). > > Correction as Russel seems to say there is only one conscious moment... how many time you run it... well under physical supervenience you have N times exactly the same conscious moment... but each run is as real and existing as the other... and there is not only one... saying there is only one is rejecting physical supervenience.
Quentin > Like say when I'm running an actual program (any one, not a "conscious" > one if that exist) in a VM with recorded inputs of a previous run... > everytime I run it, it is running and instantiated (not just once)... > likewise a "conscious" program, under physical supervenience, the conscious > moment would be "existing" everytime I run it and not just once. > > >> >> How does this undermine physical supervenience? The brain wetware, >> photographic film, and computer memory are all physical things that >> instantiate the appropriate states and the conscious experience supervenes >> on these. The architecture of the computer that simulates consciousness >> does not matter as long as it accurate reproduces the appropriate brain >> states. > > > Multiple realisation does not undermine physical supervenience... what > undermine it, is that you're forced to accept (with the movie graph > argument) that the consciousness is supervening on the movie + broken > gate... which is absurd, and the conclusion is either that physical > supervenience is false or computationalism is... > > Quentin > > I agree with that... I'm just saying that if you say, under physical > supervenience, that running N times the conscious moment does not > instantiate it N times, then you simply reject physical supervenience... > > >> >> >> Bruce >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
