On 3/26/2015 8:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
2015-03-25 12:25 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>:
2015-03-25 12:09 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>
<mailto:[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>> a écrit :
> Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>
<mailto:[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>> a
écrit :
> > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>
> >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish"
<[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>
<mailto:[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>> a
écrit :
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin
Anciaux wrote:
> >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb"
<[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>
<mailto:[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>>> a
écrit :
> >> > >
> >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial
input,
by hypothesis
> >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when
the
inputs came from
> >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't
tell as
it receives
> >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but
*exactly*
the same. So
> >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or
none are.
> >> >
> >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious
observer moments no
> >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and
replayed,
whatever).
> >> >
> >> > Cheers
> >>
> >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false...
> >
How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates
from
producing the same supervening effect. In this case it
would be
two different instances of the physical process producing
the same
conscious thoughts.
If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not
only
one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical
supervenience, it's the physical token that generates
consciousness. So
if ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the
cpnsciuous
able program with the correct inputs,
Because there is only one conscious moment
then you reject physical supervenience.
I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain
states.
It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain wetware or in
an
accurate record of these brain states on a film or in a computer
memory. It
is the states (or sequence of states) that makes up the conscious
experience. If the record is exact, then replaying it reproduces
exactly
the initial conscious experience (as Russell points out), not some
other
experience.
Yes... that's what I said... replaying it N times under physical
supervenience
means you have N times the conscious moment supervening on the
substrate *in
realtime* (exactly the same conscious moment) but it is instantiated N
times,
not only once... (when I say realtime, it's not that the inner time of
the
conscious moment should be one to one with the external time where that
conscious moment is supervening, but that the conscious moment exists
at the
same time it is running) (as Russel seems to say).
Correction as Russel seems to say there is only one conscious moment... how
many
time you run it... well under physical supervenience you have N times
exactly the
same conscious moment... but each run is as real and existing as the
other... and
there is not only one... saying there is only one is rejecting physical
supervenience.
If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know which one of the two,
and I can't say that my last remembered moment was run on one or other or my next
anticipated moment will be run on one or other. If one computer stops it makes no
difference to me and if a third computer running my mind comes online it makes no
difference to me. So effectively there is only one conscious moment. Under physical
supervenience, stopping all the computers stops the conscious moment.
I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum part.
In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-experience), and Quentin is right:
we can attribute consciousness in each running (but then if we attribute it to the
physical activity token: we get the absurd conclusion: playing records and real-time
consciousness supervene on a static film, etc.
What happens is that consciousness here and now exist by the existence of the
computation (and thus in arithmetic), and the probability of this or that
differentiation has to take into account all the running in arithmetic (and not all
playing records). here the running are the computations, or the triple (universal
number, program, a number of steps), and the records are the Gödel number of those
computations. Both are realized in arithmetic, but the computation are realized in some
standard interpretation of arithmetic, and the Gödel numbers are only syntactical
description of them so that the machine and us know which computation we are talking about.
Russell used the ...-1-1-1-1-view, but in MGA (and UDA) we need to use some 3-1 views,
or 3-1-1 views.
Consciousness depends only on the existence of the (relevant) computations, but the
relative stability of the local consciousness flux depends on the relative proportion of
histories/dreams, and for this we need to consider the 1-views attributed to person, but
incarnated in some 3p activity (program executions), and thus we need to use
(implicitly) some 3-1 view.
If 100 computers, physically distinct, "run my consciousness" (simultaneously or not),
it is the same consciousness, and the 1p is unique, but I will prefer that 1% of the
running differentiate into an hellish experience instead of 99%.
This seems like branch counting in MWI. If one branches in a hellish experience while 99
continue on the same non-hellish path then there are only two streams of consciousness.
So does your FPI tell you you have probability 1/2 of experiencing hell or does the amount
of physical instantiation determine the measure?
Brent
For extracting the physics, this 3-view is needed, or at least helps, I think. In modal
logic, those are given by multi-modal expression, like []<1>[2]P, for example, which
admits a non ambiguous interpretation in arithmetic, as they are all defined from the
Gödel arithmetical 'Beweisbar' predicate ([]p).
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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