On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 25, 2015, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>
wrote:
2015-03-25 12:25 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>:
2015-03-25 12:09 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <[email protected]>:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le 25 mars 2015 07:27, "Quentin Anciaux" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> a écrit :
> Le 25 mars 2015 07:23, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> a écrit :
> > On 3/24/2015 11:18 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >>
> >> Le 25 mars 2015 05:08, "Russell Standish"
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Mar 25, 2015 at 12:25:04AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux
wrote:
> >> > > Le 25 mars 2015 00:11, "meekerdb" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]
>> a écrit :
> >> > >
> >> > > When rerunning the program with the recorded initial
input, by hypothesis
> >> > > the second run must be as conscious as the first when the
inputs came from
> >> > > the 'real' external world... The program itself can't
tell as it receives
> >> > > exactly the same inputs... Not similar inputs but
*exactly* the same. So
> >> > > either the second run is as conscious as the first or none
are.
> >> >
> >> > Or there is precisely one sequence of conscious observer
moments no
> >> > matter how many times it is rerun (or recorded and replayed,
whatever).
> >> >
> >> > Cheers
> >>
> >> Then in this case physical supervenience is false...
> >
How so? Supervenience doesn't forbid different substrates from
producing the same supervening effect. In this case it would be two
different instances of the physical process producing the same
conscious thoughts.
If it's different instances both moment are conscious... Not only
one... The how many time it is run is important as by physical
supervenience, it's the physical token that generates consciousness.
So if ypu say that it doesn't matter how many times you run the
cpnsciuous able program with the correct inputs,
Because there is only one conscious moment
then you reject physical supervenience.
I do not think this follows. Consciousness supervenes on the brain
states. It does not matter if these are instantiated in brain
wetware or in an accurate record of these brain states on a film or
in a computer memory. It is the states (or sequence of states) that
makes up the conscious experience. If the record is exact, then
replaying it reproduces exactly the initial conscious experience (as
Russell points out), not some other experience.
Yes... that's what I said... replaying it N times under physical
supervenience means you have N times the conscious moment
supervening on the substrate *in realtime* (exactly the same
conscious moment) but it is instantiated N times, not only once...
(when I say realtime, it's not that the inner time of the conscious
moment should be one to one with the external time where that
conscious moment is supervening, but that the conscious moment
exists at the same time it is running) (as Russel seems to say).
Correction as Russel seems to say there is only one conscious
moment... how many time you run it... well under physical
supervenience you have N times exactly the same conscious moment...
but each run is as real and existing as the other... and there is
not only one... saying there is only one is rejecting physical
supervenience.
If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know
which one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered moment
was run on one or other or my next anticipated moment will be run on
one or other. If one computer stops it makes no difference to me and
if a third computer running my mind comes online it makes no
difference to me. So effectively there is only one conscious moment.
Under physical supervenience, stopping all the computers stops the
conscious moment.
I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum part.
In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-experience), and
Quentin is right: we can attribute consciousness in each running (but
then if we attribute it to the physical activity token: we get the
absurd conclusion: playing records and real-time consciousness
supervene on a static film, etc.
What happens is that consciousness here and now exist by the existence
of the computation (and thus in arithmetic), and the probability of
this or that differentiation has to take into account all the running
in arithmetic (and not all playing records). here the running are the
computations, or the triple (universal number, program, a number of
steps), and the records are the Gödel number of those computations.
Both are realized in arithmetic, but the computation are realized in
some standard interpretation of arithmetic, and the Gödel numbers are
only syntactical description of them so that the machine and us know
which computation we are talking about.
Russell used the ...-1-1-1-1-view, but in MGA (and UDA) we need to use
some 3-1 views, or 3-1-1 views.
Consciousness depends only on the existence of the (relevant)
computations, but the relative stability of the local consciousness
flux depends on the relative proportion of histories/dreams, and for
this we need to consider the 1-views attributed to person, but
incarnated in some 3p activity (program executions), and thus we need
to use (implicitly) some 3-1 view.
If 100 computers, physically distinct, "run my
consciousness" (simultaneously or not), it is the same consciousness,
and the 1p is unique, but I will prefer that 1% of the running
differentiate into an hellish experience instead of 99%.
For extracting the physics, this 3-view is needed, or at least helps,
I think. In modal logic, those are given by multi-modal expression,
like []<1>[2]P, for example, which admits a non ambiguous
interpretation in arithmetic, as they are all defined from the Gödel
arithmetical 'Beweisbar' predicate ([]p).
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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