On Friday, March 27, 2015 at 12:43:04 AM UTC+1, Bruce wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > On 25 Mar 2015, at 16:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
> >> 
> >> If my mind is being run on two separate computers, I can't know which 
> >> one of the two, and I can't say that my last remembered moment was run 
> >> on one or other or my next anticipated moment will be run on one or 
> >> other. If one computer stops it makes no difference to me and if a 
> >> third computer running my mind comes online it makes no difference to 
> >> me. So effectively there is only one conscious moment. Under physical 
> >> supervenience, stopping all the computers stops the conscious moment. 
> > 
> > I am OK. I think Quentin is arguing in the reducto ad absurdum part. 
> > 
> > In a sense both Russell is righ (there is only one 1p-experience), and 
> > Quentin is right: we can attribute consciousness in each running (but 
> > then if we attribute it to the physical activity token: we get the 
> > absurd conclusion: playing records and real-time consciousness supervene 
> > on a static film, etc. 
>
> One problem is that this is an invalid "argument from incredulity". The 
> fact that you find this conclusion absurd is not an argument against the 
> conclusion: it is merely a statement about how you fell about the 
> conclusion -- which could be right or wrong, and in either case does not 
> depend on how you feel about it. 
>

Why or how is anybody arguing that problem is generated or solved by "how 
somebody feels about it"? 

It's via contradiction/standard reductio: assume conclusion false and 
negation to be true, and from this we derive contradiction. If latter is 
the case, conclusion must be true. 

Only two things are required: law of excluded middle and if statement 
implies something false, it must be false. PGC


 

>
> I think there are important points buried here and I will attempt to 
> explore them in more detail in another post -- I am rather short of time 
> today. 
>
> Bruce 
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to