On 13 May 2015, at 08:20, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 03:45:09PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That might be the idea. It is difficult to get to this, though,
since the notion of "primary materialism" doesn't really feature in
the argument. Before we get to the MGA, the dovetailer has been
introduced, and this is supposed to emulate the generalized brain
(even if the generalized brain is the whole galaxy or even the
entire universe) infinitely often, and the laws of physics emerge
from the statistics of all UD-computations passing through my actual
state.
I can get it, but by an indirect route.
Basically, the MGA shows a contradiction between computationalism and
physical supervenience. But only for non-robust ontologies.
But it is the only place where we need it. In robust ontologies,
UDA1-7 is enough (to get the problem, not his solution!).
For a
robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically instantiated,
therefore the MGA is invalid.
I don't see this. The "if A then B else C" can be realized in a
newtonian universe, indeed in the game of life or c++.
And the duplication of universe, one where A is realized, and B is
realized
+ one in which A is not realized and C is realized,
might NOT makes a non counterfactually correct version of that if-then-
else suddenly counterfactually correct.
Counterfactuals and MWI (and robustnesse) are a priori independent
notions.
Now physical supervenience has been demonstrated to a high level of
empirical satisfaction.
I don't think so, unless you mean physical in some non aristotelian
sense, in which case you are right, but that does not falsified comp,
in that case.
So we can conclude either that
computationalism is falsified, or that our ontology is robust. But if
the ontology is robust, UDA 1-7 demonstrates the reversal - physics
depends only on the properties of the universal machine, not on any
other ontological property of "primitive reality". Therefore we can
excise the "physicalness" of ontology - anything capable of universal
computation will do, such as arithmetic.
But this chain of argument is not the usual one, so clearly it needs
to be examined critically. Bruno has not given his imprimatur to it,
dor example. Also, the MGA itself needs to shoring up, particularly
with respect to the requirement of counterfactual correctness, and
also that other issue I just raised about the recording player
machinery changing the physical arrangement, perhaps by just enough to
render physical supervenience toothless too. In which case the whole
thing falls apart.
This is a bit unclear to me. You might decompose your thought in some
steps, with what is assumed and what is derived, as I am lost here.
Bruno
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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected]
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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