On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:33:42PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >On 13 May 2015, at 08:20, Russell Standish wrote: > > > >>For a > >>robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically instantiated, > >>therefore the MGA is invalid. > > > >I don't see this. The "if A then B else C" can be realized in a > >newtonian universe, indeed in the game of life or c++. > >And the duplication of universe, one where A is realized, and B is realized > >+ one in which A is not realized and C is realized, > >might NOT makes a non counterfactually correct version of that > >if-then-else suddenly counterfactually correct. > > > >Counterfactuals and MWI (and robustnesse) are a priori independent notions. > > For once I agree with Bruno. I think this is right and that > counterfactuals are not, as Russell suggests, instantiated in the > other worlds of the MWI in any useful sense. >
How does that work? Are you saying the counterfactual situations never appear anywhere in the Multiverse? What principle prevents their occurrance? -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
