Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:33:42PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 08:20, Russell Standish wrote:
For a
robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically instantiated,
therefore the MGA is invalid.
I don't see this. The "if A then B else C" can be realized in a
newtonian universe, indeed in the game of life or c++.
And the duplication of universe, one where A is realized, and B is realized
+ one in which A is not realized and C is realized,
might NOT makes a non counterfactually correct version of that
if-then-else suddenly counterfactually correct.
Counterfactuals and MWI (and robustnesse) are a priori independent notions.
For once I agree with Bruno. I think this is right and that
counterfactuals are not, as Russell suggests, instantiated in the
other worlds of the MWI in any useful sense.
How does that work? Are you saying the counterfactual situations never
appear anywhere in the Multiverse? What principle prevents their occurrance?
By the meaning of the term: *counter*factual, i.e., contrary to the
facts of the situation. As far as I know there is a philosophical theory
of counterfactuals based on possible worlds. But these are generally
though to be imaginary. And my feeling is that the 'other worlds' of the
MWI or other Hubble volumes, etc, are just philosophical possible other
worlds. We can say anything about them that we like because it can never
be checked -- they are physically inaccessible in principle.
But we are always going to have difficulty assigning a truth value to a
counterfactual like: "The present king of France has a beard."
Bruce
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