On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both >>>>> copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong >>>>> in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the >>>>> origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the >>>>> original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a >>>>> bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy >>>>> was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy >>>>> would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy >>>>> was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer >>>>> until the 0.1% copy was revived. >>>>> >>>>> How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a >>>>> tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two >>>>> new >>>>> persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the >>>>> level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we >>>>> cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning >>>>> restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big >>>>> toe is not a relevant difference. >>>>> >>>>> It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and >>>>> better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but improved. >>>>> >>>> >>>> What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost >>>> instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in these >>>> scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, then there is >>>> no duplication! >>> >>> >>> I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary >>> life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller >>> because I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I >>> was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a >>> copy that hadn't grown was made somewhere else. >>> >>> >>> I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against being the >>> closest continuation. >>> >> >> What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another >> location and the copy moved to the original's bed? >> >> >> That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that >> asleep=mindless. Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both the >> original and the copy find himself in a disjoint location incompatible with >> where he was before? >> > > The copy will find himself in the bed he fell unconscious in, and the > original will find himself moved. Both would feel they were a continuation > of the original, but not knowing about the switch they might guess wrong as > to which was which. > > > In what sense would they be wrong. They would have different memories and > be different persons. >
One would be the copy and the other would be the original, but there would be no way to tell which was which without referring to a record of the procedure. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
