On 23 Jun 2015, at 07:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Pierz wrote:
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015 at 11:31:26 AM UTC+10, Bruce wrote:
The point is that one should capture as much of the notion of
personal
identity that we use everyday as is possible. In particular, it
should
take account of those difficult cases where memory is lost or
impaired
in one way or another. Bruno's definition is just too
restrictive to be
of any use in the real world.
Any use in the what?? I suppose the practical applications for
"closest continuer" theory are manifold?
Yes. And I have given a few of them in recent posts.
The point is that if computationalism is true, then identity can be
defined in terms of the state of a computing device (brain or its
replacement device) at some level of substitution - the theory does
not need to specify what that is.
But the question is whether computationalism *is* true?
Not really. Only at the pause café. The question is more can
physicalism remains true in the case computationalism is true, and
what is more plausible, what invoke less assumption.
Physicists does not address the qualia question. The machine's answers
already address the qualia and other non communicable type of truth,
at the start.
One way that you can test a theory is to see if its predictions are
in accordance with real world data. That is what we are doing here.
Yes.
For the purposes of the early steps of UDA it's enough to agree
that a duplication is in principle possible. This seems to follow
unless you add some magical ontological property of self-ness over
and above the mere physical/computational configuration of a person.
That is your level of obfuscation. There is no ontological property
of selfness over and above the physical manifestation in closest
continuer theory. If anything, the dualism resides in
computationalism.
It would, if you could prove the ontological existence of the
primitive matter, or if you could give evidence for that primacy, or a
reason for it.
Arguing about whether closest continuer is a better theory of
personal identity just seems to muddy the waters AFAICT. Closest
continuer seems to be a theory about semantics - like the old
argument about removing planks from one ship and putting them on
another - at what point does identity become exchanged? That is a
silly, pointless argument to have because it's just a matter of
definition.
So you seek to end the discussion by proposing your own arbitrary
definition?
It is just that "closer continuer" needs a topology, rarely given.
Comp provides a notion of "closest continuers" with a varying topology
for the different views. In many case, there are infinities of closer
continuers, and simple first person selection, à-la WM.
Which definition, moreover, does not accord with many common
experiences in the real world.
If comp is true then *something in the computational state of the
observer* must account for the continuity of observer moments.
That's all you need to know,
Great. So its a "shut up and calculate theory"?
It is shut up on irelevant point, and aboard the real problem.
Also, note the implicit dualism in your statement above! "Something
in the computational state....". What, exactly?
What is needed to encapsulate digitally for the comp survival
assumption to make sense.
Bruno
Bruce
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