On 6/25/2015 11:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, June 24, 2015, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 11:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net');>> wrote:
On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many
counts. Both
copies consider themselves to be the original -
both
are wrong
in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different
from the
origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the
original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit
taller and a
bit happier for the experience. On the other
hand,
if one copy
was 1% different and the other 0.1% different,
the
0.1% copy
would be a continuation of the original. And if
the
0.1% copy
was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would
be the
continuer
until the 0.1% copy was revived.
How are you going to measure these fine
differences? If
there is a
tie according to any appreciable measurement, then
there
are two new
persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only
accurate at the
level of replacement, which is never assumed to be
exact
-- we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum
cloning
restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms
in
your big
toe is not a relevant difference.
It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is
taller and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he
is
the true JC, but improved.
What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost
instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new
persons
in these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the
machine, then there is no duplication!
I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in
ordinary
life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up
tomorrow
taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I would
still
consider that I was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I
would stop being me if a copy that hadn't grown was made
somewhere else.
I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against
being
the closest continuation.
What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another
location
and the copy moved to the original's bed?
That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that
asleep=mindless.
Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both the original
and
the copy find himself in a disjoint location incompatible with
where he
was before?
The copy will find himself in the bed he fell unconscious in, and the
original
will find himself moved. Both would feel they were a continuation of the
original, but not knowing about the switch they might guess wrong as to
which
was which.
In what sense would they be wrong. They would have different memories
and be
different persons.
One would be the copy and the other would be the original, but there would
be no
way to tell which was which without referring to a record of the procedure.
ISTM there's an equivocation here between a continuation in consciousness
and
continuation in body. If we say "the person" is just a continuum of
conscious
thoughts, then they are both continuations of the original. If we take
into account
the physical instantiation then we can say which is the original (assuming
he's not
destroyed and reconstructed in the duplication process) even though they
are both
continuations, by different means, of the original.
Surely continuation in consciousness is what we mean when discussing personal identity.
The atoms making up my body last year have mostly dispersed in the biosphere, but I
don't consider that a great loss.
That's a logic chopping answer. Sure the atoms have dispersed, but the physical
structural relations have persisted and these are not the same as conscious thoughts.
Brent
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