On 6/22/2015 11:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 23 June 2015 at 14:19, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:On 6/22/2015 8:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer until the 0.1% copy was revived. How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two new persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big toe is not a relevant difference. It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but improved. What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost instantaneously, so there are essentially always two new persons in these scenarios. If they are made to be different by the machine, then there is no duplication! I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't grown was made somewhere else.I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against being the closest continuation. What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another location and the copy moved to the original's bed?That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that asleep=mindless. Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both the original and the copy find himself in a disjoint location incompatible with where he was before? The copy will find himself in the bed he fell unconscious in, and the original will find himself moved. Both would feel they were a continuation of the original, but not knowing about the switch they might guess wrong as to which was which.In what sense would they be wrong. They would have different memories and be different persons.One would be the copy and the other would be the original, but there would be no way to tell which was which without referring to a record of the procedure.
ISTM there's an equivocation here between a continuation in consciousness and continuation in body. If we say "the person" is just a continuum of conscious thoughts, then they are both continuations of the original. If we take into account the physical instantiation then we can say which is the original (assuming he's not destroyed and reconstructed in the duplication process) even though they are both continuations, by different means, of the original.
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