On 23 June 2015 at 10:05, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >> >> On 22 June 2015 at 17:33, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "closest continuer" idea is wrong on many counts. Both >>>> copies consider themselves to be the original - both are wrong >>>> in your view. But if one copy was 0.1% different from the >>>> origina, that copy would not be the continuation of the >>>> original, despite thinking that he was, just a bit taller and a >>>> bit happier for the experience. On the other hand, if one copy >>>> was 1% different and the other 0.1% different, the 0.1% copy >>>> would be a continuation of the original. And if the 0.1% copy >>>> was in a coma when created, the 1% copy would be the continuer >>>> until the 0.1% copy was revived. >>>> >>>> How are you going to measure these fine differences? If there is a >>>> tie according to any appreciable measurement, then there are two new >>>> persons. Don't forget that the duplication is only accurate at the >>>> level of replacement, which is never assumed to be exact -- we >>>> cannot have exact copies because of the quantum cloning >>>> restrictions. The odd difference in the number of atoms in your big >>>> toe is not a relevant difference. >>>> >>>> It's easy to measure differences. One of the new JC's is taller and >>>> better looking. Naturally, he claims that he is the true JC, but improved. >>>> >>> >>> What he claims is irrelevant. The copies diverge almost instantaneously, >>> so there are essentially always two new persons in these scenarios. If they >>> are made to be different by the machine, then there is no duplication! >> >> >> I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary life, >> but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up tomorrow taller because >> I had a growth spurt during the night I would still consider that I was me; >> yet by the "closest continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that >> hadn't grown was made somewhere else. >> >> >> I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against being the >> closest continuation. >> > > What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another > location and the copy moved to the original's bed? > > > That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that asleep=mindless. > Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both the original and the > copy find himself in a disjoint location incompatible with where he was > before? >
The copy will find himself in the bed he fell unconscious in, and the original will find himself moved. Both would feel they were a continuation of the original, but not knowing about the switch they might guess wrong as to which was which. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
