On 23 June 2015 at 10:37, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> meekerdb wrote: > >> On 6/22/2015 2:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On Tuesday, June 23, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto: >>> [email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> On 6/22/2015 3:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> I diverge from my previous self from moment to moment in ordinary >>>> life, but I still consider that I remain me. If I woke up >>>> tomorrow taller because I had a growth spurt during the night I >>>> would still consider that I was me; yet by the "closest >>>> continuer" theory, I would stop being me if a copy that hadn't >>>> grown was made somewhere else. >>>> >>> >>> I think waking up somewhere else would count strongly against >>> being the closest continuation. >>> >>> What if, while both are asleep, the original is moved to another >>> location and the copy moved to the original's bed? >>> >> >> That would help, but there's an implicit assumption that asleep=mindless. >> Anesthetic would make a better example. But won't both the original and the >> copy find himself in a disjoint location incompatible with where he was >> before? >> > > I think part of the problem here is that the first-person impression is > taken to be definitive. Since the closest continuer theory weights bodily > continuity fairly highly in the metric whereby 'closest' is to be > determined, what happens to your body, whether or not you are conscious of > it, is an important consideration. Similarly, physical causal connections > weight significantly. Consequently, moving while asleep or anaesthetized > are scarcely relevant to the personal identity issue. If this ad hoc addition is part of the closest continuer theory (I admit I haven't read Nozick's original paper) then it just further discredits it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
